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THE RIGHT TO SPEAK, THE RIGHT
TO HEAR, AND THE RIGHT NOT TO
HEAR: THE TECHNOLOGICAL
RESOLUTION TO THE CABLE/
PORNOGRAPHY DEBATE
Michael I. Meyerson*
Cable television brings many channels of programming into
the home. Amid this cornucopia, some programs occasionally
contain nudity or offensive language, "pornography" to those offended. There has been much debate over whether cable pornography should be regulated. Not only must policy makers decide
if regulation is desirable, the courts must determine the appropriate legal standard for evaluating the legality and constitutionality of such regulation. In July 1986, by a "bare majority," the
Attorney General's Commission on Pornography voted against
applying to cable television the same standard used to bar "indecent" radio and television broadcasts. 1 Two months after the
issuance of the Commission's report, a federal judge endorsed,
for the first time, the argument that "indecent" cable programming could be regulated and limited to nighttime viewing. 2 On
March 23, 1987, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a decision striking down a Utah law that barred "indecent" cable programming. 3 Because the Court did not issue an opinion, however, the precise basis for the Court's decision is not clear.
The new technology of cable television, thus, has resurrected
an old problem: how should society balance the competing
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. B.A., Hampshire
College, 1976; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1979. Support for this Article was provided by the University of Baltimore School of Law Summer Research Stipend. I wish to
thank Charles Rees for his valuable comments and suggestions. I am responsible for any
errors.
1. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. FINAL REPORT,
105 (1986) [hereinafter COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY) (statement of Father Bruce Ritter).
2. Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989, 992 (10th Cir. 1986) (Baldock, J., concurring),
summarily aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1559 (1987). Previous lower courts all have found such regulation unconstitutional. See id. aff'g Community Television, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F.
Supp. 1099 (D. Utah 1985); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985), aff'g 571 F.
Supp. 125 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Community Television, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164
(D. Utah 1982); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 986 (D. Utah 1982).
3. Wilkinson v. Jones, 107 S. Ct. 1559 (1987), aff'g 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986).

137

138

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 21:1 & 2

claims of those who wish to avoid exposure to "offensive" material in their homes with those who wish to communicate freely or
to receive the material. The Supreme Court has discussed the
issue of the right of privacy in the home many times,• but it has
not yet decided how the privacy interest affects the ability to
regulate this new form of communication.
This Article will attempt to create a framework for analyzing
the competing interests on each side of the cable/pornography
debate. 11 The goal is to construct an analysis that will be consistent with current Supreme Court teaching on how government,
under the first amendment,6 may constitutionally regulate pornography, particularly in the name of protecting those who wish
to avoid exposure to such material. Accordingly, this Article will
presume the validity of all relevant Supreme Court decisions
and their stated rationales. 7 Thus, the current restrictive definition of obscenity8 and broader definition of indecency in broadcasting9 will be followed.
This Article will also accept the governmental interests found
by the Court to support regulation of obscenity and indecency.
The Supreme Court has held that the overriding societal interest
in stemming the commercial distribution of obscenity permits
the government to ban obscene material, even if only willing
adults have access to it. This interest encompasses: "the interest
4. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978); Rowan v. United States
Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86, reh'g denied, 336 U.S. 921 (1949).
5. The commonly used term "pornography" does not have a specific legal definition.
This Article uses the term to include material that is either obscene under Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), or indecent, as defined in FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726 (1978). Cf. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (referring to visual
depiction of sexual conduct by children as "child pornography").
6. The first amendment states that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. See generally Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976) (stating that the Supreme Court's "institutional duty is to follow until changed the law as it now is").
8. Under Miller, the three-part test for obscenity is:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted).
· 9. The Supreme Court defined indecency as "language that describes [or pictures
that depict], in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the
day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience." FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 732 (1978) (quoting Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98
(1975)). The Supreme Court held that indecent broadcasts may be barred in the middle
of the afternoon. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750; see infra text accompanying notes 69-96.
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of the public in the quality of life and the total community environment, the tone of commerce in the great city centers, and,
possibly, the public safety itself."10
In contrast, the Court has allowed the regulation of indecency
only to protect unwilling viewers: adults who wish to avoid the
material and children whose parents want to shield them from
offensive material. 11 This Article will proceed on the Court's assumption that "vulgar" language and depictions of sexual activity are "'patently offensive' to most people regardless of age.m 2
Even with these assumptions, this Article concludes that the
power of government to regulate cable pornography is limited to
that which is legally obscene. Part I reviews Supreme Court
cases delineating the relationship between the rights of privacy
in the home and of freedom of speech. Part II demonstrates that
· the technology of cable television provides the solution to the
pornography dilemma. Cable television preserves both privacy
and speech interests because individual subscribers can be given
the physical means to block out programming they find personally offensive without affecting the ability of others to receive
that programming. Where such accommodation of interests is
permissible, the first amendment prohibits censorship as an
overbroad remedy that needlessly infringes on the rights of
speakers and willing listeners.
Part III of the Article analyzes how the cable/pornography debate is affected by the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
(the Cable Act). 13 The Cable Act, the first comprehensive federal
legislation governing the regulation of cable television, mandates
a policy towards cable pornography comparable to that required
by the first amendment. The Cable Act limits the ability of all
levels of government to regulate cable programming to the regu10. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973).
11. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49.
12. Id. at 757 (Powell, J., concurring). Thus, this Article does not provide an analysis
of the appropriateness of using majoritarian tastes to determine what is offensive. See
Haiman, Speech u. Privacy: ls There a Right Not to be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U.L. REV.
153 (1972).
Deference is being paid to the sensibilities and privacy claims of the prevalent
groups in society who happen to find certain kinds of erotic communication or
certain kinds of words deeply repulsive, while no comparable concern is shown
for minorities who may have no "hang-ups" about those particular kinds of communication, but who may be just as deeply offended by different verbal and visual stimuli which few would seriously propose to exclude from a public forum.
Id. at 191 (emphasis in original).
13. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified at 47 U.S.C.§§ 521-559 (Supp. III
1985) and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.). Sections of the
Cable Act will be referred to by their original numbering throughout the Article.
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lation or banning of obscene cable programming, but also requires cable operators to provide devices to their subscribers
that can block out programming.
Finally, the article explores the special congressional protection for access channels-channels set aside as a public forum
for the use of all members of a community or for mandatory
leasing to programmers who are not affiliated with the cable operator. On these channels, the Cable Act prohibits censorship
not only by the government, but by the cable operator and even
the entity managing the public access channels. In sum, both the
first amendment and the Cable Act permit cable television to
advance the public's interest in receiving "the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources. " 14
I.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVACY OF THE HOME

Within the context of the home, the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech has taken on an anomalous shape. In
some instances, the Supreme Court has found the protection of
free expression at its strongest in the home, barring regulation
that would be permitted elsewhere. 111 At other times, the Court
has permitted constitutionally protected expression to be restricted or prohibited altogether, precisely because of the involvement of the home. 16
The issue in all these decisions has been the determination of
the effect "the unique privacy interests of persons residing in
their homes" 17 has on the fundamental principles of the first
amendment. These privacy interests can encompass a desire either to receive or to avoid particular speech in the sanctity of
one's home. The two types of privacy interests create quite different issues because the interest in receiving information coincides with the free speech interests of the speaker, although that
of avoiding speech presents a direct conflict with the speaker's
14. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
15. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (overturning conviction for private possession of obscene material in the home); see also Frisby v. Schultz, 56 U.S.L.W.
4785, 4788 (U.S. June 28, 1988) (No. 87-168) (stating that "in many locations, we expect
individuals simply to avoid speech they do not want to hear," but "individuals are not
required to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes").
16. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (upholding restriction
on "indecent" broadcasting); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (plurality opinion)
(upholding ban on sound trucks in residential areas).
17. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 638 (1980).
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interests. When the interests coincide, the result could be
termed "super-first amendment" protection that overpowers
otherwise valid state interests. 18 Sometimes, though, a person
seeks refuge in the home from the speech of others. In explaining the "householder's right to be left alone,m 9 the Court has
noted, "Great as is the value of exposing citizens to novel views,
home is one place where a man ought to be able to shut himself
up in his own ideas if he desires. " 20
As the Supreme Court has stated, conflicts between speakers
and unwilling listeners "demand delicate balancing because: 'In
th[e] sphere of collision between claims of privacy and those of
[free speech or] free press, the interests on both sides are plainly
rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our society.' " 21 In fact, when the privacy interest involves avoiding unpleasant or undesirable speech, the balance becomes even more
delicate than this quote would indicate. The complexity increases because there are usually three, rather than two, interests involved. Not only does one party seek to speak and a second wish to avoid that speech, generally a third party also wants
to receive the message in question. 22 Thus, a speaker who desires
to address a wide audience may only be silenced if the listeners
include a "captive audience" that cannot escape the speech. 23
The nature of the audience differs with the method of communication used. Different media intrude in different ways into the
home and present different degrees of difficulty for a person desirous of avoiding the messages they contain. Therefore, courts
have devised different standards to govern the varied forms of
18. See infra text accompanying notes 27-34.
19. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 619 (1976).
20. Id. (quoting z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 406 (1954)); see also
Frisby v. Schultz, 56 U.S.L.W. 4785, 4788 (U.S. June 28, 1988) (No. 87-168) ("There is
simply no right to force speech into the home of an unwilling listener.").
21. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208-09 (1975) (quoting Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975)). In quoting from Cox Broadcasting, the Erznoznik decision did more than merely add the bracketed reference to "free
speech"; it changed the meaning of the word "privacy." The earlier case, dealing with
publication of a rape victim's name, had involved the publication of private facts. Cox
Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 492. See generally Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,
4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (1890) (discussing the desirability of protection from unwanted
press coverage of personal information). By contrast, Erznoznik dealt with shielding onlookers from nudity displayed at drive-in movie theaters. Although the quote is still appropriate, it alters the context of privacy from freedom from unwanted publicity, Cox
Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 489, to protection against "unwilling exposure to materials
that may be offensive." Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 208.
22. See generally Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 SUP. CT.
REV. 233, 264-65.
23. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541-42 (1980).
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communication, so as to maintain the balance between the competing interests. 2 •
A.

The Basic Framework: Stanley and Kovacs

The protection of the right of individuals in their own homes

to receive or avoid messages is best illustrated by two seemingly
disparate first amendment cases that focus on rights of the listener, not the speaker. In Stanley v. Georgia, 25 the home created
an impenetrable wall, keeping government away from the private enjoyment of even legally obscene films. In Kovacs v.
Cooper, 28 the Court permitted the government to create a regulatory wall that kept otherwise constitutionally protected speech
out of the home because it came from a loudspeaker.
In Stanley, the Court overturned the conviction for "possession of obscene matter" of a man who had kept three reels of
eight millimeter film in a desk drawer in his upstairs bedroom. 27
The Court stated that if the films were obscene, they would not
be protected by the first amendment. 28 Nonetheless, although
the films and, therefore, presumably the filmmaker, remained
outside the Constitution's free speech umbrella and subject to
governmental regulation, the recipient of the message-the film
watcher-had an independent constitutional right: "the right to
read or observe what he pleases-the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home." 29
Essentially a constitutional "alloy," this right combined the
first amendment right to receive information30 with the fourth
amendment's guarantee of freedom from "unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy." 31 Just as steel is stronger than
24. "Each method of communicating ideas is a 'law unto itself' and that law must
reflect the 'differing natures, values, abuses, and dangers' of each method." Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
25. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
26. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
27. 394 U.S. at 558. The police were searching the house for evidence of bookmaking
activities. They apparently found no evidence of wrongdoing other than the film.
28. Id. at 560 (applying Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957)); accord
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
29. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
30. Id. at 564; see also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976).
31. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). The Court relied on Justice Brandeis's statement about the rationale behind the fourth amendment: "The makers of our
Constitution ... conferred ... the right to be left alone-the most comprehensive of
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its component elements of iron and carbon, this compound constitutional right outweighed governmental interests that justified
regulation when only the first amendment was involved. 82
The Supreme Court has held that government may ban obscene material to safeguard broad societal interests such as "the
quality of life and the total community environment" and "the
public safety itself."88 Yet the Court has found these interests
insufficient to permit a state to criminalize private possession of
obscenity in the home:
Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the
privacy of one's own home. If the First Amendment
means anything, it means that a State has no business
telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books
he may read or films he may watch. 34
rights and the right most valued by civilized man." Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
32. The Court explored the first amendment's impact on the fourth amendment's
guarantee against unreasonable searches in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547
(1978), holding that the first amendment did not totally prohibit the use of search warrants to obtain information from newspaper offices. The Court stressed that the fact that
a newspaper, and not some other commercial establishment, was the subject of the warrant would affect the determination of the "reasonableness" of the search.
Where the materials sought to be seized may be protected by the First Amendment, the requirements of the Fourth Amendment must be applied with
"scrupulous exactitude." "A seizure reasonable as to one type of material in one
setting may be unreasonable in a different setting or with respect to another
kind of material."
Id. at 564 (citations omitted); see also id. at 570 (Powell, J., concurring) ("While there is
no justification for the establishment of a separate Fourth Amendment procedure for the
press, a magistrate asked to issue a warrant for the search of press offices can and should
take cognizance of the independent values protected by the First Amendment . . . . ").
33. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973); see supra text accompanying note 10.
34. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565. The Supreme Court has held that Stanley is not controlling in a case involving only speech or only privacy interests. Rather than treating
Stanley as involving the combination of speech and privacy interest, the Court has
somewhat inconsistently argued that Stanley rested only on whichever interest was not
in the particular case before it. For example, in holding that the right to possess obscene
material in one's home does not give a corollary right to purchase or import obscene
material or to transport it in interstate commerce, the Court stated that Stanley "reflects no more than ... the law's 'solicitude to protect the privacies of the life within
[the home].'" United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 127 (1973) (quoting
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)); see also Paris Adult
Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 66 (Stanley was "hardly more than a reaffirmation that 'a man's
home is his castle.'"). On the other hand, in rejecting an argument that Georgia's sodomy statute violated the right of privacy, the Court stated that Stanley was not a case
about privacy in the home but "was firmly grounded in the First Amendment." Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986).
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In contrast, although the State has no interest that would justify regulating the private consumption of books and films, the
Supreme Court in Kovacs held that a municipality could ban
sound trucks in order to preserve a residential neighborhood's
peace and quiet. BG The governmental concern in Kovacs focused
on the home dweller who wanted to avoid the speech from the
sound truck but could not shut out the noise: "[The unwilling
listener] is practically helpless to escape this interference with
his privacy by loud speakers except through the protection of
the municipality." 36
In Kovacs, the Court acknowledged that speakers have a first
amendment right not only to speak, but also to attempt to locate
those who wish to receive their messages. 37 The Court concluded, however, that the interest in protecting people in their
homes from receiving speech they wished to avoid outweighed
this first amendment right. It did not matter to the Court that
not every person in the community wanted to keep out the information provided by the sound trucks or that some might actually wish to receive the information being offered. 38 The Court
found it enough that "some" in the community might find the
noise objectionable. 39
The basic framework constructed by the Supreme Court in
Stanley and Kovacs thus gives a person at home both the absolute constitutional right to read books or watch movies and the
right, protectable by government, to avoid exposure to undesired
speech. The permissible role of government when these rights
collide presents the next question.

B.

The I deal Balance: The Post Office Cases

The postal system represents the only form of mass communication entering the home that has been available ever since the
35. 336 U.S. at 87 (plurality opinion).
36. Id. at 86-87.
37. Justice Reed stated, "The right of free speech is guaranteed every citizen that he
may reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so there must be opportunity to win
their attention." Id. at 87.
38. Although no Justice voting to uphold the ordinance discussed the "willing listener," it can be presumed that loudspeakers would not have been widely used or considered "essential to the sound thinking of a fully informed citizenry," id. at 102 (Black, J.,
dissenting), if some home residents did not receive and consider the messages being
offered.
39. Id. at 81.
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drafting of the Constitution.' 0 After a long journey, the Supreme
Court has finally reached a balance for the regulation of the postal system that protects the rights of speakers and the twin
rights of home dwellers to see and not to see.
At first, the Court granted the Postal Service broad powers to
regulate the content of the mail it carried. 41 Because other, albeit less efficient, means always existed to convey one's written
messages, the Court granted the government great latitude in
determining what messages to classify as unmailable: "The legislative body in thus establishing a postal service may annex such
conditions to it as it chooses. "' 2
Oliver Wendell Holmes attacked this permissive interpretation in a notable dissent. According to Justice Holmes, "The
United States may give up the Post Office when it sees fit, but
while it carries it on the use of the mails is almost as much a
part of free speech as the right to use our tongues. "' 3 In 1965,
the Court agreed. Lamont v. Postmaster General" struck down
as violative of the right of free speech a federal law requiring
that an addressee make a request in writing before the Post Office would deliver "communist political propaganda."n Significantly, the Court based its decision not on the right to distribute
the publications, but on the rights of those who wished to receive them. 48 For instance, in his concurring opinion, Justice
Brennan declared the right to receive publications to be a fundamental right, stating that "[t]he dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To establish
Post Offices and post roads . . . . ").
41. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
42. Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497,506 (1904); see also Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 736 (upholding the power of Congress to bar obscene, indecent, and immoral material from the mails, so that the mail "not be used to transport such corrupting publications and articles"). See I. PooL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 86-87 (1983)
for a list of some of the materials that have, at one time or another, been declared unmailable. (The list includes liquor ads when liquor was illegal; solicitations appearing to
be bills; unsolicited ads for contraceptives; prize fight films; fraudulent matter; lotteries;
obscene matter; sexually oriented ads; pandering ads; securities offerings other than by
an approved prospectus; matters inciting arson, murder, or assassination; and material
obstructing conscription.)
43. United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson,
255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting). This sentence has been quoted approvingly in a number of cases, including Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965);
Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 416 (1971); and Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463
U.S. 60, 70 n.18 (1983).
44. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
45. Id. at 307.
46. Id.
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receive and consider them."·" He added, "It would be a barren
marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers."48
Although the problem of protecting "unwilling addressees"
from offensive mail was merely a side issue in Lamont,4 9 the
Court directly confronted the question in Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp.Go Bolger involved a challenge to a ban on the
mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives. The
government attempted to justify its prohibition as necessary for
shielding home dwellers and their children from potentially offensive materials.u The Court dismissed this concern about offensiveness as one that "carries little weight."u The Court held
that suppression of speech is not justified merely because some
may find it offensive.Gs Even though it acknowledged the privacy
interest in the home, the Court stated that recipients of objectionable mailings do not constitute a "captive" audience; unlike
the home dwellers in Kovacs, the recipients can "effectively
avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by
averting their eyes. "G4
The Court also refused to consider children as a captive audience needing special governmental protection because of the
ease with which parents can police a mailbox. r,r, Moreover,
whatever "marginal degree of protection" the ban provided in
helping parents control how their children learned about "sensitive" subjects like birth control,r,e it was deemed insubstantial as
compared to the harm resulting from keeping the material away
from adults: "The level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply
47. Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).
48. Id.
49. See id. at 310 (Brennan, J., concurring). The majority opinion did not address
this issue at all.
50. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
51. Id. at 71.
52. Id. As Justice Stevens pointed out, the "offensiveness" in this case involved the
ideas expressed in the contraceptives advertisement, not the style or manner of expression. Id. at 84 (Stevens, J., concurring). Thus, the ban was essentially a constitutionally
suspect viewpoint-based restriction. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 12-2, at 581 (1978) (stating that governmental action aimed at the communicative
impact of speech "is presumptively at odds with the first amendment").
53. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 71; accord Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 701
(1977).
54. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 72 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980)).
55. The Court distinguished offensive mailings from similarly offensive radio broadcasts by stating: "The receipt of mail is far less intrusive and uncontrollable." Id. at 74.
See infra text accompanying notes 69-95, for discussion of regulation of broadcasting.
56. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 73.

FALL 1987-WINTER 1988)

Cable/Pornography Debate

147

cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a
sandbox. " 67
In Bolger, the Supreme Court thus found that the right of a
speaker to communicate through the mails outweighed a recipient's interest in preventing entry into the home of objectionable
material. 68 Although the Court in Lamont had held that requiring a recipient to request material unconstitutionally burdened
the right to receive information, the Bolger Court stated that the
"short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash can ...
is an acceptable burden" on the right to avoid offensive material.69 This burden is only acceptable, however, when the combined rights of a speaker to send the material and of a willing
home dweller to receive it balance against the rights of an unwilling recipient. When the willing recipient does not appear in
the equation, the balance shifts in favor of the right to limit the
material that enters one's home.
In Rowan v. United States Post Office Department, 60 for example, the Supreme Court upheld a law prohibiting a mailer
from sending further advertisements to people who had previously notified the Post Office that they considered that mailer's
advertisements to be "erotically arousing or sexually provocative. " 61 The Court stressed that the law did not allow the government to determine what mailings were objectionable but left
this determination entirely to each individual's "complete and
unfettered discretion"; thus, the law preserved individual autonomy by permitting home dwellers to exclude mail they found offensive from their mailbox. 62 In upholding the ban, the Court
refused to impose a burden on the citizen to "determin[e] on
repeated occasions whether the offending mailer has altered its
material so as to make it acceptable."63 Thus, the Court held
that the "[regular] journey from mail box to trash can," which it
found sufficient for protecting individuals from "offensive" unsolicited contraceptive advertisements, constituted an unaccept57. Id. at 74.
58. See id. at 78 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("(I]ndividuals are able to avoid the information in Youngs' advertisements after one exposure" by having their names removed
from the mailing list).
59. Id. at 72 (quoting Lamont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880,
883 (S.D.N.Y.), summarily aff'd, 386 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 915
(1968)).
.
60. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
61. 39 U.S.C. § 3008(a) (1982).
62. Rowan, 397 U.S. at 734, 736.
63. Id. at 738.
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able burden on the "very basic right to be free from [unwanted]
sights, sounds, and tangible matter" in Rowan. 64
Though the Court has not explained the distinction between
Bolger and Rowan, the fundamental difference between the two
cases appears to be that, in Rowan, the government's protection
of the right of another not to see did not deny any "willing listener" the right to receive information. The statutory scheme
found constitutional in Rowan permitted those who wanted to
avoid certain speech to do so without infringing on the ability of
others to receive it. Even if some speakers may have been frustrated by their inability to convert "unwilling" listeners, the
statute created a narrow and justifiable limitation on the right of
free speech.
According to then Associate Justice Rehnquist, "First Amendment freedoms would be of little value if speakers had to obtain
permission of their audiences before advancing particular viewpoints. "66 Such a requirement obviously would injure both
speakers and willing, even arguably non-objecting, listeners.
When the unwilling listener can be isolated, however, the "ancient concept that 'a man's home is his castle' into which 'not
even the king may enter' " 66 prevails over the right of a speaker
to try to attract that listener's attention. There is simply no constitutional right to send unwanted material into the home: "[A]
mailer's right to communicate must stop at the mailbox of an
unreceptive addressee."67
In the postal cases, the Court has reached as close to an ideal
solution as can be achieved in a complex world of competing interests and differing tastes. First, the government is kept out of
the business of deciding what material is offensive. 68 Second, the
right to see and the right not to see are protected. Home dwellers are given the right to keep material they have found to be
offensive out of their homes, but this protection will be provided
in such a way as to leave unimpaired the rights of those who
wish to receive those same publications. This scheme does not
provide complete protection for the sensitive because they must
64. Id. at 736.
65. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 80 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
66. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970).
67. Id. at 736-37; see also Frisby v. Schultz, 56 U.S.L.W. 4785, 4788 (U.S. June 28,
1988) (No. 87-168).
68. Legally obscene material, however, can still be barred from the mails, even if sent
to a willing recipient. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971). For a history of the
ban on mailing obscene publications, see Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 500-18
(1962) (Brennan, J., concurring).

FALL 1987-WINTER 1988]

Cable/Pornography Debate

149

endure an initial exposure to an offensive advertisement before
receiving protection. Nonetheless, a significant difference exists
between a one-time exposure to and continual confrontation
with such material. Furthermore, considering the competing
speech interests at stake in the balance, the Rowan solution
seems to represent a workable compromise.
Unfortunately, not all forms of communication lend themselves as readily to this sort of accommodation of interests. Electronic communications present an especially difficult combination of interests to balance and one that advances in technology
continually alter.

C. Broadcasting: The Pig in the Parlor
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 69 the Supreme Court faced the
question of the Federal Communications Commission's power to
protect radio listeners who wished to keep indecent, though not
legally obscene, broadcasts out of their homes and away from
their unsupervised children. 70 At two o'clock on a Tuesday afternoon, a New York City radio station played a recorded monologue by a "satiric humorist," George Carlin, describing repeatedly, explicitly, and presciently "the words you couldn't say on
the public ... airwaves."71 The FCC did not impose any penalty on the station, but issued a warning that it would consider
sanctions against the station if future indecent broadcasts occurred. The radio station appealed the warning issuance.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of barring
constitutionally protected, though indecent, language from the
airwaves in the middle of the afternoon. 72 Unlike prior broad69. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
70. Ironically, the sole person to complain about the program at issue heard the
broadcast while driving in his car. His child, rather than listening without parental supervision, sat next to him. Id. at 730. Nonetheless, both the FCC and the Court apparently acted on the assumption that the complaining parent spoke for those in the more
vulnerable position at home.
71. Id. at 729. Justice Powell described the recording as "a sort of verbal shock treatment." Id. at 757 (Powell, J., concurring).
72. The Court stressed that the FCC order did not completely ban all indecent
speech, or even the Carlin monologue, from the airwaves. Id. at 750. The FCC criticized
the station for broadcasting the monologue "at a time when children were undoubtedly
in the audience (i.e., in the early afternoon)." Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 99 (1975).
In a second opinion, the FCC emphasized that it had not established "an absolute prohibition on the broadcast of this type of language, but rather sought to channel it to times
of day when children most likely would not be exposed to it." Pacifica Found., 59
F.C.C.2d 892, 892 (1976) (petition for clarification or reconsideration). Thus, Justice
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casting cases, however, the Court did not base its holding on the
scarcity of airwaves and the subsequent need for government to
regulate broadcast licensees in the public interest. 73 Rather, the
Court relied on the need to preserve the home as a sanctuary,
safe from unwanted sounds. The Court emphasized this concern
in its famous paraphrase of the zoning rationale that permits the
isolation of an activity considered to constitute a nuisance:
"[W]hen the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor,
the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof
that the pig is obscene."74 The Court thus characterized broadcasting as posing a "unique" threat to the peace of the parlor
because of its "uniquely pervasive presence" and unique accessibility to children. 711
Although it may appear somewhat contradictory to use analogies in discussing a "unique" form of communication, the Court
compared the broadcast audience to the Kovacs home dweller
who was unable to avoid a loudspeaker, rather than to a mail
recipient who could effortlessly discard unwanted advertisements.76 The Court treated the radio listener as a member of a
captive audience in need of governmental protection: because
the audience frequently tunes in at the middle of a program,
prior warnings cannot provide complete protection. 77
Powell wrote that the Commission order being reviewed did not prohibit "broadcasting
the monologue during late evening hours when fewer children are likely to be in the
audience." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring). The FCC has recently decided, however, that even the hours between 10:00 p.m. and midnight might not be appropriate for such programming because, at least on weekends, a significant number of
children are still in the broadcast audience. Pacifica Found., FCC 87-138, para. 16
(adopted Apr. 16, 1987) (LEXIS, Fedcom Library, FCC file).
73. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396 (1969); NBC v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943). The FCC made the argument that spectrum
scarcity justified the ban on indecent speech both in its order, Pacifica Found., 56
F.C.C.2d at 97, and in its brief to the Supreme Court, Brief for the Federal Communications Commission at 37-40, FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (No. 77-528).
The Supreme Court did not even address the relevance of the issue. Yet as Justice Brennan argued, "although scarcity has justified increasing the diversity of speakers and
speech, it has never been held to justify censorship." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 770 n.4 (quoting Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon, C.J.) (striking down
FCC action) (emphasis in original)).
74. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750-51. The original quote was "nuisance may be merely a
right thing in the wrong place-like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
75. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49.
76. See supra notes 53-54.
77. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. In discussing the holding of Pacifica, the Court has
since said that "the medium's uniquely pervasive presence renders impossible any prior
warning for those listeners who may be offended by indecent language." FCC v. League
of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 n.13 (1984). Indeed, immediately prior to the broadcast of the Carlin monologue, the radio station had given a warning that the recording

FALL 1987-WINTER 1988)

Cable/Pornography Debate

151

In his dissent, Justice Brennan rejected any characterization
of the radio listener as "captive" because "an individual voluntarily chooses to admit radio communication into his home" and
could, therefore, prevent offensive speech from entering by simply removing the radio. 78 The majority did not answer this argument directly but seemed to find unrealistic the solution of telling listeners to evict their radios to avoid offensive
programming. The Court described radio as "a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans."79 With 98.6% of all
Americans owning radios and 97% owning televisions,80 the
Court chose to treat the entry of radio and television broadcasting into the home as universal and inevitable. Once radio programs were viewed as invitees into the American home, it was a
small step for the Court to require that programmers behave
like invited guests. 81
Once a guest in the home, broadcasting can have an enormous
impact on the parental and societal interest in protecting the
welfare of children. The Court found the Carlin monologue,
which "could have enlarged a child's vocabulary in an instant,"82
particularly offensive because of the likely presence of unsupervised children in the audience. The Court regarded broadcasting as different from other forms of communication because
of the ease with which children can receive broadcast programming.83 Moreover, because broadcasting is available to any child
with access to a radio or television, it differs from other forms of
communication, such as books and movies, that "may be withheld from the young without restricting the expression at its
source. " 84
The Court rejected an argument, similar to one later accepted
in Bolger, that a ban of offensive material is unnecessary because offended home dwellers could avoid further offense by
averting their eyes. 86 According to the Court, applying such a
concept to broadcasting "is like saying that the remedy for an
contained "sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some." Pacifica,
438 U.S. at 730 (quoting Pacifica's response to the initial complaint).
78. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 764-66 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 748 (emphasis added).
80. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 542 (1985) (figures for utilization of media in 1975).
81.
Justice Powell referred to the "right not to be assaulted by uninvited and offensive sights and sounds." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 759 (Powell, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 749.
83. Id. at 750.
84. Id. at 749.
85. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983).

152

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 21:1 & 2

assault is to run away after the first blow.''86 This right to avoid
"the first blow" closely resembles the interest announced in
Rowan of avoiding the imposition on home dwellers of "the burden of determining" the acceptability of each piece of mail. 87
That interest superseded speech interests in the postal cases,
but only when protection of that interest did not deny a willing
third party the right to receive information. 88 In Pacifica, however, the Court discounted the countervailing interest of home
dwellers who wanted to listen to the "offensive" broadcast on
the theory that they could easily receive the identical message
through tapes, records, nightclubs, and, perhaps, late night
broadcasts. 89 As Justices Powell and Blackmun, who supplied
the critical fourth and fifth votes for the majority, stated in their
concurrence, "I doubt whether today's decision will prevent any
adult who wishes to receive Carlin's message in Carlin's own
words from doing so. " 90
This analysis underestimates the "willing" listener's interest
in having access to uncensored broadcasts. The Court ignores
the benefit to listeners of receiving programming at a convenient
time at no charge through their radios, when the only alternatives require spending money for records or nightclubs. 91 Additionally, the Court misidentifies the speaker: by tuning the dial
to a particular station, the listener has indicated a desire to hear
the speech of the broadcaster, who may well use other persons'
taped messages to communicate the station's message. Thus, a
limitation on a broadcaster's speech restricts desired communication between a willing speaker-the broadcaster-and a willing listener, to protect the unwilling listener.
86. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
87. Id. at 749; Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).
88. In fact, the Pacifica Court cites Rowan for the proposition that "in the privacy of
the home ... the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. This equation omits reference to
the impairment of the right of those who wish to receive information.
89. 438 U.S. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 762 (Powell, J., concurring). The concurrence acknowledged that the argument that the FCC ruling "prevents willing adults from listening to Carlin's monologue
over the radio in the early afternoon hours ... [and] will have the effect of 'reduc[ing]
the adult population ... to [hearing] only what is fit for children'... is not without
force." Id. at 760 (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)). Nonetheless,
Justice Powell concluded that the interest was "not sufficiently strong" to overturn the
ruling. Id.
91. As Justice Brennan stated, "The opinions ... display ... a sad insensitivity to
the fact that these alternatives involve the expenditure of money, time, and effort that
many of those wishing to hear Mr. Carlin's message may not be able to afford . . . . " Id.
at 774 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Generally, the government may not silence a speaker to protect the squeamish. 92 The government inay not shield the unwilling viewer at the expense of the willing viewer if both viewers may be accommodated. Silencing speech is only permitted
when "substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner."93 Thus, the result in Pacifica can
be justified only upon a finding that no alternative means exist
to protect unwilling listeners from the offensive speech in their
homes. 94 Once a court rejects both the listener's options of removing the radio from the home altogether and of changing the
channel after hearing offensive speech, there is indeed no way
the broadcast audience can avoid offensive programming "without restricting the expression at its source."911
Government cannot protect the right to avoid unwanted
broadcast messages without simultaneously restricting the right
to speak and the right to receive information in the home. 96
When a speaker transmits the message via the mails rather than
the airwaves, however, the unwilling recipient can be protected
separately; thus, an accommodation of competing rights is required. To determine whether indecent material can be barred
from cable television, it is therefore necessary to examine the
physical characteristics of that medium to determine whether
the right to avoid such material can be protected in such a way
as to avoid limiting the first amendment rights of others.
II.

CABLE TELEVISION AND PORNOGRAPHY: THE TECHNOLOGICAL
SOLUTION

Although the pictures from both broadcast television stations
and cable systems appear on the same home television screen,
the technologies of the two media differ significantly. Broadcast
signals travel through the airwaves, sharing the limited radio
spectrum, and all who own radios and television sets may receive
92. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1975); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
93. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21; see also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 530, 541 (1980) (adopting the Cohen analysis).
94. "Where a single speaker communicates to many listeners, the First Amendment
does not permit the government to prohibit speech as intrusive unless the 'captive' audience cannot avoid objectionable speech." Consolidated Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 541-42.
95. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749.
96. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 n.13 (1984).
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these signals. 87 In contrast, a cable system carries its signals
through enclosed wires made of either a metal coaxial cable or a
thin glass pipe known as optical fiber, and these signals only
enter the homes of subscribers. 88
As a result of the technological differences between cable and
broadcast television, a cable system can provide far more channels, and thus much more programming, than that offered by a
broadcaster. 88 Cable systems currently carry thirty-six, fifty-four
or even one hundred channels: "an electronic medium of communications more diverse, more pluralistic, and more open,
more like the print and film media than our present broadcast
system.moo Although this cornucopia obviously advances the
97. See generally NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-13 (1943) (describing the
chaotic proliferation of radio stations prior to federal regulation of airwaves). Some have
argued that the FCC's division of the radio spectrum has actually increased the scarcity
of signals by limiting the number of stations available. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 547 (2d ed. 1977) ("The scarcity of television channels differs from the scarcity of
other natural resources only in the fact that it is to a significant extent the product of
deliberate governmental policies!"); see also Schuessler, Structural Barriers to the Entry
of Additional Television Networks: The Federal Communication Commission's Spectrum Management Policies, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 875, 988-91 (1981).
98. For an excellent discussion of the technology of a cable system, see S. WEINSTEIN,
GETMNG THE PICTURE 17-40 (1986).
The cable system gathers signals from local and distant broadcast stations, satellites,
and directly from local programming studios at the cable "headend," where the signals
are each assigned a frequency and sent through the cable system. The cables that pass
through the community are either laid underground or hung from utility poles.
The capital costs of constructing a cable system are quite high, with aerial construction costing between $7500 and $15,000 a mile and underground construction costing as
much as $100,000 a mile. Id. at 17; see also Berkshire Cablevision, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F.
Supp. 976, 986 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985) (estimating a
cost of $7,000,000 to wire Newport County, Rhode Island). Accordingly, three federal
appellate courts have termed cable television a "natural monopoly." Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, 800 F.2d 711, 717 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 1358 (1987); Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126
(7th Cir. 1982); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1379
(10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982); cf. Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 n.8 (1974) (describing electric company as a natural monopoly "created by the economic forces of high threshold capital requirements and virtually unlimited economy of scale").
99. "Unlike ordinary broadcast television, which transmits the video image over airwaves capable of bearing only a limited number of signals, cable reaches the home over a
coaxial cable with the technological capacity to carry 200 channels or more." Quincy
Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169
(1986).
100. CABINET COMM. ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, CABLE: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 15
(1974); see also H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AoMIN. NEWS 4655, 4658-59 (legislative history of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521559 (Supp. III 1985) and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.))
(describing cable systems with as many as 108 channels). Currently, 37.2% of all cable
systems have a channel capacity of 35 to 53 channels and 6.6% have a capacity of 54
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first amendment interest in the diversity of programming, 101 it
also creates some delicate problems. Cable programs generally
are not sufficiently explicit to be considered legally obscene, yet
they are often substantially more sexually explicit than anything
on broadcast television. 102 Such programming may contain
nudity, depictions of sexual activity, and sexually explicit or profane language. 103 Much of this type of programming would undoubtedly be classified as "indecent" and;thus, barred from the
broadcast media. 10•
The availability of such indecent programming on the home
screen for the first time has led to calls for regulation and censorship of indecency on cable. 105 For such regulation to be valid,
however, it must be permissible under both the federal Cable
Act and the Constitution. Because the statutory scheme explicitly depends on the resolution of the constitutional issue, 106 the
constitutional analysis will precede the discussion of the legislative framework.
A.

The Constitutional Balance: The Required
Accommodation of Interests

Thus far, every court to consider the constitutionality of laws
barring indecent programming from cable television has found
the laws unconstitutional. 107 Whatever the validity of the lower
courts' ultimate holding, their underlying legal analysis has
channels or more. Cable System Channel Usage, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Sept. 22, 1986, at
45.
101. See Central Telecommunications, Inc., 800 F.2d at 717.
102. 1 COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 1, at 282-83.
103. Id. at 1421. See generally Waters & Gelman, Cable's Blues in the Night, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 24, 1981, at 48.
104. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 726-41 (1978); 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982).
105. Both the City of Miami and the State of Utah have enacted laws restricting
indecent cable fare. See Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), aff'g Community Television, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Utah 1985), summarily aff'd,
107 S. Ct. 1559 (1987); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985), aff'g 571 F. Supp.
125 (S.D. Fla. 1983). Additionally, the organization, Morality in Media, has proposed a
"model cable indecency statute." Krattenmaker & Esterow, Censoring Indecent Cable
Programs: The New Morality Meets the New Media, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 606, 610
(1983).
106. For example, rather than ban obscene and indecent programming from cable,
Congress prohibited the transmission of programming that was "obscene or otherwise
unprotected by the Constitution of the United States . . . . " Cable Act § 639, 47 U.S.C.
§ 559 (Supp. III 1985); see infra text accompanying notes 197-225.
107. See Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), summarily aff'd, 107 S.
Ct. 1559 (1987); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985); Community Television,
Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah 1982); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson,
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failed to incorporate the Supreme Court's teaching on the relationship between the form of communication used to transmit
"offensive" messages and the scope of a government's power to
protect a home dweller's right to avoid that message.
In Wilkinson v. Jones, 108 the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a lower court's decision striking down Utah's cable indecency law. Although a summary a.ffirmance constitutes the
Court's holding as to the merits of a case, 109 the Court has cauticmed that such an affirmance has "considerably less precedential value" than an opinion on the merits.U 0 Most importantly, a
summary affirmance does not affirm the rationale behind a judgment, only the judgment itself. 111 Thus, especially when there is
more than one rationale for a holding, it is impossible to tell the
reasoning endorsed by the Court.
The lower court in Wilkinson 112 found several defects in the
indecency law. The court stated that the state law was preempted by the federal Cable Act, 113 unconstitutionally vague, 114
and overbroad because it regulated cable programming that was
not obscene under the test set out in Miller v. California. 1111 The
briefs filed with the Supreme Court reflected the variety of
grounds on which the lower courts relied. 116 Because the lower
court's opinion rested on both the nonconstitutional ground of
indecency and the previously established vagueness rationale,
531 F. Supp. 987 (D. Utah 1982). But see Jones, 800 F.2d at 992 (Baldock, J., concurring) (arguing that cable indecency can be regulated, but not prohibited).
108. 107 S. Ct. 1559 (1987), aff'g 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), aff'g Community
Television, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Utah 1985).
109. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975).
110. Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 180-81
(1979).
111. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977).
112. The Tenth Circuit did not add to the district court's analysis but "affirmed its
judgment on the basis of the reasons stated in the opinion." Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d
989, 991 (10th Cir 1986), summarily aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1559 (1987). Hence, reference to the
"lower court" in that case means the opinion of the District Court.
113. Community Television, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1105 (D. Utah
1985); see infra text accompanying notes 226-41.
114. Community Television, 611 F. Supp. at 1117 (stating that defining indecent programming by its "time, place, manner, and context" failed to describe with "narrow
specificity" which programs were prohibited).
115. Id. at 1106-15 (relying on Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
116. The Jurisdictional Statement for the State of Utah posed the question of the
law's validity in the broadest possible way: whether the first amendment denies government "any power" to restrict cable indecency "in any circumstances," Jurisdictional
Statement at i, Wilkinson v. Jones, 107 S. Ct. 1559 (1987) (No. 86-1125). In contrast, the
Motion to Affirm listed three rationales for striking down the law: vagueness, an unconstitutional restriction on protected speech, and preemption by the Cable Act. Motion to
Affirm at i.
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the Supreme Court's affirmance cannot be relied upon as a
groundbreaking precedent holding all regulation of cable indecency unconstitutional. 117
In addition to not announcing a standard for the regulation of
cable television content, the Supreme Court has thus far failed
to establish a framework for evaluating the constitutionality of
any cable television regulation. In the only case in which the
Court has issued an opinion, City of Los Angeles u. Preferred
Communications, Inc., 118 the Court merely ruled that the construction and operation of a cable system "plainly implicate
First Amendment interests. " 119 Of course, as the Court itself acknowledged, this characterization "does not end the inquiry.
'Even protected speech is not equally permissible in all places
and at all times.' " 120 The Court declined to decide whether Los
Angeles had, as alleged, violated Preferred Communications'
first amendment rights by refusing to grant it a cable television
franchise. Instead, the Court remanded the case to the district
court to resolve the underlying factual disputes between the
parties. 121
The Court also declined to announce the legal standard for
evaluating first amendment challenges to cable franchising. 122 In
comparing cable to other forms of communication with well established first amendment standards, m the Court stated that
117. See Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S, 173, 176 (1977) (stating that a summary affirmance "should not be understood as breaking new ground but as applying principles established by prior decisions to the particular facts involved"); see also id. at 180 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that judges must determine whether a summary disposition
does "not even arguably [rest] upon some alternative nonconstitutional ground"). Because the District Court specifically found that the Utah law acted as a total ban on
indecent programming and "does not channel indecency to specific viewing hours," Community Television, 611 F. Supp. at 1114-15, neither the Tenth Circuit's nor the $upreme
Court's affirmance resolves the constitutionality of a statute that restricted indecency to
late night hours. See infra discussion accompanying notes 176-88.
118. 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
119. Id. at 494.
120. Id. at 495 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc. 473
U.S. 788, 799 (1985)); see, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 561
(1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[T)o say the ordinance presents a First Amendment
issue is not necessarily to say that it constitutes a First Amendment violation.") (emphasis in original); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972) ("Recognition that First
Amendment rights are implicated, however, is not dispositive of our inquiry here.").
121. Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. at 496. The major factual disputes focused
on whether cable systems cause "traffic delays and hazards and esthetic unsightliness"
and whether sufficient economic demand exists to support competing cable operators. Id.
at 493.
122. Id. at 495; see Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, 800 F.2d
711, 714 (8th Cir. 1986).
123. Compare Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking
down a law requiring newspapers to grant a right-of-reply) with Red Lion Broadcasting
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cable resembled both the unregulated print media and the more
regulated broadcast media:
Cable television partakes of some of the aspects of speech
and the communication of ideas as do the traditional enterprises of newspaper and book publishers, public
speakers and pamphleteers. [Preferred's] proposed activities would seem to implicate First Amendment interests
as do the activities of wireless broadcasters, which were
found to fall within the ambit of the First Amendment
. . . even though the free speech aspects of the wireless
broadcasters' claim were found to be outweighed by the
government interests in regulating by reason of the scarcity of available frequencies. 124
As the concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall and O'Connor, makes clear, the Court left "open
the question of the proper standard."12& Moreover, the concurrence stressed that nothing requires the Court to limit its choice
to one of the preexisting first amendment models; it could
choose to create a new, more appropriate standard just for cable:
"In assessing First Amendment claims concerning cable access,
the Court must determine whether the characteristics of cable
television make it sufficiently analogous to another medium to
warrant application of an already existing standard or whether
those characteristics require a new analysis. " 138
One other point must be noted. Whatever standard the Court
eventually creates will not apply in the same way to every type
of cable regulation. There are numerous types of possible regulation, including exclusive franchises, rate regulation, requirements for third-party access, and regulation of program content.127 Each form of regulation has a different effect on a cable
operator's "speech," and each implicates a different governmental interest. Thus, the statement by one member of the Commission on Pornography that cable indecency regulation would inevitably lead to equal time requirements for cable programmers is
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the fairness doctrine as applied to
broadcasters).
124. Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. at 494-95.
125. Id. at 496.
126. Id. (emphasis added).
127. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 §§ 611,612, 621-624, 637,638, 47
U.S.C. §§ 153, 201, 531-532, 541-544, 557-558 (Supp. III 1985).
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in error. 128 The physical scarcity rationale for the equal time requirement for broadcasters remains distinct from the concerns
of pervasiveness and availability to children that support indecency regulation. 129 Although broadcasting and cable may similarly implicate a particular rationale, this does not mean they
have a similar impact on other concerns. Courts and legislators
will, therefore, have to analyze each form of regulation separately, to see if it is constitutionally justifiable. 130
Lacking specific guidance from the Supreme Court, many
lower courts have addressed the constitutionality of barring indecent cable programming and have tried to decide whether
cable sufficiently differs from broadcasting, so that Pacifica
would not apply to cable programming. 131 One court distinguished cable from broadcasting because "[i]n the cable medium, the physical scarcity that justifies content regulation in
broadcasting is not present. " 132 This distinction is irrelevant to
the analysis of Pacifica because the Supreme Court did not rely
on physical scarcity to uphold the regulation of broadcast
indecency. 183
Other courts have tried a more comprehensive comparison between the two media. For example, several courts have relied on
the following list of differences between cable television and
128. 1 CoMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 1, at 104-05 (statement of Father Bruce
Ritter)
[A]lmost all of the principal religious denominations and religious broadcasters
unanimously fought such an equation of broadcast and cable television on the
grounds that it might seriously impede their own religious freedom to control
their programming as they saw fit and might compel them to grant equal time to
atheist or agnostic or anti-religious presentations.
. . . The fact is . . . that unless we equate broadcast and cable television, the
FCC has no constitutional right to regulate programming on cable using the indecency standard upheld by the Pacifica decision.
Id.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75. Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) with FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
130. See, e.g., Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1452-53 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986) (distinguishing "must-carry" rules, which mandated carriage of local broadcast signals, from public access requirements: "[U]nlike access rules,
which serve countervailing First Amendment values by providing a forum for public or
governmental authorities, the must-carry rules transfer control to local broadcasters who
already have a delivery mechanism granted by the government without cost and capable
of bypassing the cable system altogether.").
131. E.g., Community Television, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1112-13 (D.
Utah 1985), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), summarily
aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1559 (1987); Community Television, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164,
1167 (D. Utah 1982); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1420 (11th Cir. 1985), aff'g 571 F.
Supp. 125, 131-32 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
132. Community Television, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. at 1112.
133. See supra discussion accompanying notes 73-74.
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broadcasting to conclude that reliance on Pacifica to support
regulation of indecent cable programming is "misplaced": 134
Cable

Broadcast

1. User needs to subscribe.

1. User need not subscribe.

2. User holds power to
cancel subscriptions.

2. User holds no power to
cancel. May complain to
FCC, station, network,
or sponsor.

3. Limited advertising.

3. Extensive advertising.

4. Transmittal through
wires.

4. Transmittal through
public airwaves.

5. User receives signal on
private cable.

5. User appropriates signals
from the public
airwaves.

6. User pays a fee.

6. User does not pay a fee.

7. User receives preview of
coming attractions

7. User receives daily and
weekly listing in public
press or commercial
guides. ·

8. Distributor or
distributee may add
services and expanded
spectrum of signals or
channels and choices.

8. Neither distributor nor
distributee may add
services or signals or
choices.

9. Wires are privately
owned.

9. Airwaves are not
privately owned but are
privately controlled.

The most remarkable feature of this comparison is that none
of these differences, alone or in the aggregate, adequately distinguishes cable from broadcasting for purposes of determining the
constitutionality of indecent programming regulation. For example, points 1, 2, and 6 (the need to subscribe, the power to cancel, and the payment of a fee) seem to argue that a viewer volun134. Community Television, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. at 1167. In Cruz v. Ferre,
the district court repeated this list, 571 F. Supp. at 132, and the Eleventh Circuit later
cited the same list, 755 F.2d at 1420 n.5.
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tarily allows cable, but not broadcasting, to enter and remain in
the home. Broadcast viewers, however, can turn off or throw out
the offending television set; thus, they possess the same choice
as to whether or not to allow the programming into their homes.
Pacifica hints that the universal use of broadcasting necessitates
a remedy for indecent programming other than the discarding of
radios and televisions, 1811 but this suggestion does not negate the
voluntary nature of the choice to own devices that receive broadcast signals. 136
Moreover, viewers in many communities need cable television
to receive broadcast signals, either because no broadcasting station operates nearby or because mountains or tall buildings prevent over-the-air reception. 137 In such communities, cable television is as commonplace as television sets. If owning a radio and
owning a television set do not constitute "voluntary" acts because they represent the only way to receive broadcast signals,
subscribing to cable is not "voluntary" when it provides the only
way to receive broadcast signals. If such "voluntariness" marked
the only distinction between broadcast and cable, two different
programming standards might exist for cable depending upon
the location of the cable system. A strange result would indeed
occur if cable systems could not carry indecent programs in communities with poor or no reception of over-the-air broadcast signals, but could carry such programming in communities with
good broadcast reception and a low percentage of subscribers. 138
The remaining differences in the list also fail adequately to
distinguish cable and broadcast television in the context of indecent programming. Point 7 (the availability of previews) not
only applies to both media, but the Court found it irrelevant in
Pacifica. If prior warnings cannot completely protect broadcast
viewers from offensive programming because they constantly
135. See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
136. Cf. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1949) (plurality opinion) (stating that
noise from a sound truck is inescapable).
137. See S. WEINSTEIN, supra note 98, at 1; see also H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note
100, at 24, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4661 (in areas with
inadequate over-the-air reception of broadcast signals, cable "was seen as an 'essential'
service"). Indeed, aiding reception of over-the-air broadcasting was the original purpose
of cable television. See generally D. BRENNER & M. PRICE, CABLE TELEVISION AND OTHER
NONBROADCAST VIDEO § 1.02(1), at 1-2 (1986).
138. Additionally, an argument that cable television is not as ubiquitous as broadcasting rests on precarious grounds because many estimate that cable use will steadily
increase over the coming years. Only 42% of American households subscribed to cable in
1985; by the end of the decade, that figure is expected to rise to 54%. See Cable Industry Growth Chart, CABLEVISION, Aug. 18, 1986, at 82.
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tune in and out, 139 prior warnings will be equally ineffective in
protecting cable viewers with similar peripatetic viewing habits.
Likewise, points 3 and 8 (the amount of advertising and the
number of channels available to the programmer) have no apparent relationship to the issue in question: the constitutionality
of regulating indecent cable programs. Whether the cable
programmer shows advertising and whether the programmer can
choose to show indecent programming on more than one channel
do not affect the concerns expressed by the Pacifica Court.
Finally, points 4, 5, and 9 (transmittal through privately
owned cables vs. public airwaves) completely misconceive the
structure of a cable system by attempting to portray cable systems as "private" modes of communication and broadcast systems as "public." It is true that the cables that carry the programs are privately owned, but so are the antennae and
equipment that send broadcast signals. A correct analogy, however, can be drawn between the public nature of the airwaves,
which justifies some broadcast regulation, 140 and the public
streets and public rights-of-way t4at a "private" cable operator
must, by definition, utilize to construct and operate the cable
system. 141 Thus, both the cable operator and broadcaster use
public resources to communicate with their listeners and viewers. Neither represents a completely public nor a completely private communications medium. 142
139. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
140. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943).
141. As explained by one court:
A newspaper may reach its audience simply through the public streets or mails,
with no more disruption to the public domain than would be caused by the typical pedestrian, motorist, or user of the mails. But a cable operator must lay the
means of his medium underground or string it across poles in order to deliver
his message. Obviously, this manner of using the public domain entails significant disruption, especially to streets, alleys and other public ways. Some form of
permission from the government must, by necessity, precede such disruptive use
of the public domain.
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1377-78 (10th Cir.
1981) (emphasis added), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982). This is consistent with
the Cable Act's definition of a cable system.
[T]he term 'cable system' means a facility, consisting of a set of closed transmission paths . . . that is designed to provide cable service which includes video
programming . . . but such term does not include . . . a facility that serves only
subscribers in 1 or more multiple unit dwellings under common ownership, control, or management, unless such facility or facilities uses any public right-ofway ....
Cable Act § 602(6), 47 U.S.C. § 522(6) (Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added).
142. As then Circuit Judge Burger explained: "The argument that a broadcaster is
not a public utility is beside the point. True it is not a public utility in the same sense as
strictly regulated common carriers or purveyors of power, but neither is it a purely pri-
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Additionally, it must be remembered that the "public interest" in using the airwaves did not represent the justification for
the regulation of indecent programming in Pacifica. 143 Rather,
the Court permitted regulation because of broadcasting's access
to the home and the ease with which children can gain access to
the programming. These rationales arguably are applicable to
cable as well as broadcasting. 144
As an alternate tack, those opposed to the regulation of nonobscene cable programming may argue that Pacifica "should be
confined to its facts, and eventually discarded as a 'derelict in
the stream of the law.' " 1411 Under this line of reasoning, Pacifica
offers no precedential value when discussing cable television because it is a "deservedly ... limited exception [to the traditional protection of non-obscene speech], for an extreme, virtually non-replicable case . . . . Pacifica truly is ... a case about
seven dirty words on radio and no more. " 146
This analysis does not suffice for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court does not appear ready to "discard" Pacifica. In
1984, the Court characterized the decision as "consistent with
our other broadcast cases.'' 147 In 1986, the Court cited the case
in support of the proposition that there is "an interest in protecting minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken language."m Even when the Court limited Pacifica by holding that
it did not apply to "offensive" mail because broadcast regulation
did not "readily translate into a justification for regulation of
other means of communication," 149 it was not at all clear that
vate enterprise like a newspaper or an automobile agency." Office of Communication of
the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The same
analysis holds true for the cable operator.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 73-96.
144. E.g., Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 128 (7th
Cir. 1982) (dictum) (stating that the rationale for regulating indecent programming "is
independent of whether the television signal comes into the home over the air or through
a coaxial cable").
145. Krattenmaker & Esterow, supra note 105, at 627 n.138 (quoting L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 67-68 (Supp. 1979)).
146. Id. at 627 (emphasis added).
147. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 n.13 (1984); see also New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 720, 749
(1978) for its reliance on "the Government's interest in the 'well-being of its youth'" to
justify regulation of indecent broadcasts).
148. Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986). Pacifica was also cited
with approval in Frisby v. Schultz, 56 U.S.L.W. 4785 (U.S. June 28, 1988) (No. 87-168).
Thus, it is inaccurate to say, as one court striking down a cable indecency law argued,
that "[r]ecent decisions of the Court have largely limited Pacifica to its facts." Cruz v.
Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1421 (11th Cir. 1985).
149. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983). Ironically, in support of this "special interest," the Court cites Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
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the Court regarded all other electronic means of communication,
as well as the mails, as distinguishable from b;oadcasting. 1110
Secondly, Pacifica should not be read as a case about "seven
dirty words," but as one involving the protection of the right to
avoid offensive material in the home. m If one accepts the
Court's basic assumptions about the "captive" nature of the
broadcast audience, 1112 Pacifica remains consistent with earlier
cases protecting the home dweller's right "to be let alone. "m
The ultimate issue, then, becomes how cable television relates
to the home dweller's right to be let alone. Is the cable viewer,
like the home dweller in Kovacs, "practically helpless to escape
this interference with his privacy . . . except through the protection of the municipality"?IM Is cable television, like broadcasting, one of those forms of communication that cannot "be withheld from the young [and unwilling adults] without restricting
the expression at its source"? 1H
The very technology of cable television, however, distinguishes
cable from these intrusive electronic means of speech because
this technology provides the ability to block out "offensive" programming from one home without silencing it at the source. Because cable television transmits its programming through wires
rather than through airwaves, individual viewers can keep programming out of their homes by selectively "blocking" the wire
before the program reaches the television set. Indeed, cable
technology offers two solutions that protect not only the right of
the home dweller to avoid offensive material, but also the rights
of the speaker and the willing viewer.
A device called a "lock box" or a "parental control device"
offers the first way to protect the unwilling cable viewer. 1116 The
device allows a viewer to use a key or numeric code to "lock out"
certain channels and keep them off the home television screen.
U.S. 367 (1969), a decision based on spectrum scarcity, not on the intrusiveness of broadcasting. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
150. In fact, despite the Court's stated desire "to emphasize the narrowness of our
holding," Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750, the Court implied that indecent telephone calls could
be analogized to indecent broadcasts. Id. at 749 & n.27.
151. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
153. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970); see also
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (plurality opinion).
154. 336 U.S. at 86-87.
155. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978).
156. See S. WEINSTEIN, supra note 98, at 48. The Cable Act requires that all cable
operators make these devices available to their subscribers. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 § 624(d)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2) (Supp. III 1985); see infra notes 19398 and accompanying text.
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It thus protects both adults wishing to avoid even a single glance
at "offensive" material and children whose parents do not want
them viewing such programs.
An "addressable converter" represents the second mechanism
for keeping offensive programming out of the home. 1117 The
traditional, or general, converter "converts" the electronic signals travelling through the cable so that they can be viewed on
the television screen. Although an addressable converter performs the same function, it also enables the cable operator to
determine which channels to send to a particular home. m Thus,
by notifying the cable operator ahead of time, subscribers can
have the operator flick a switch and block a given channel from
their sets until they reauthorize the channel.
The Report of the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography stated that lock boxes do not resolve the constitutional
issue. Although the Commission's Report does not discuss addressable converters, the arguments made against lock boxes apply to both means of blocking channels. According to the Report, Pacifica Foundation had argued in its brief that technology
existed so that television sets could be programmed to prevent
certain channels from appearing. m The Commission concluded
that, because the Court upheld the broadcast regulation in
Pacifica, "[t]he Supreme Court was obviously unimpressed by
157. See S. WEINSTEIN, supra note 98, at 41-49.
158. Id. at 41-44. "Each subscriber has a unique electronic address, so that the cable
headend has the opportunity to provide viewing authorization to each addressable converter." Id. at 41, 44. The Cable Act does not refer to addressable converters explicitly,
but leaves to franchising authorities the right to establish requirements for "facilities
and equipment." Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 § 624(b)(l), 47 U.S.C. § 544
(b)(l) (Supp. III 1985). The Cable Act only requires that the equipment be "cable-related." H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 68, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 4705. Because an addressable converter is plainly cable-related, a city
interested in keeping indecent programming away from the homes of unwilling subscribers can require that the cable operator offer addressable converters.
Addressable converters may only cost $20 more than nonaddressable converters. S.
WEINSTEIN, supra note 98, at 44. Although some cable systems may need different wiring
to be able to use addressable converters, a franchising authority can also require such
"upgrading" of a cable system when the cable franchise is renewed. Cable Act § 626
(b)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 546(b)(2) (Supp. III 1985); see also H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100,
at 20, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AoMIN. NEWS at 4657 (stating that the Cable
Act "[g]rants cities affirmative authority to require upgrading of facilities ... during the
renewal process").
159. 1 COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 1, at 581 (quoting Brief for Pacifica
Foundation at 49 n.40, FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (No. 77-528)).
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the 'lockbox' argument" and would consider it equally irrelevant
in the context of cable television. 160
This analysis is wrong for several reasons. First, the reference
to the lock box, which appeared only in a footnote of the brief, 161
hardly constituted a major part of the argument and was never
discussed by either the FCC or the Supreme Court. Moreover,
the probable reason that the Court did not discuss the device, if
it came to their attention at all, was that a device to control
what a viewer sees on a television set is simply not relevant to
an analysis of an FCC ruling on indecent radio programming. As
the Court stressed, "the focus of our review must be on the
Commission's determination that the Carlin monologue was indecent as broadcast."162 Thus, Pacifica does not foreclose a finding that cable lock boxes provide an appropriate means for protecting unwilling viewers.
The Attorney General's Commission also criticized blocking
devices because "the method is far from foolproof. " 163 The Report describes three instances in which "adult" programming
"slipped through an electronic loophole.'' 1 " The very few instances when unwanted programming has slipped through, however, are insufficient to render the blocking technologies an inadequate solution. It is irrational to bar all indecent programming
when virtually all offensive programs can be blocked, simply because of the freak possibility that an indecent program will both
get through the technological barrier and be seen by an offended
viewer. 1611 A cable system should not be purged of programming
160. Id. Although the Commission on Pornography makes this observation in support
of its argument that the FCC should regulate "obscene" cable programming, id. at 573,
their argument would apply as well to a ban on "indecent" programming.
161. Brief for Pacifica Foundation, supra note 159, at 49 n.40. The appendix to the
brief included an advertisement for a device called a "Video Protector." Id. at 20a.
162. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 735 (1978). There is also a difference between requiring parents to pay between $50 and $60 for the right to enjoy otherwise free
broadcast television without fear of indecent programming, Brief for Pacifica Foundation
supra note 159 at 20a, and requiring such an outlay in addition to other payments necessary to receive cable television. The first alters the fundamental concept of the medium;
the second is perfectly consistent.
163. 1 COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 1, at 581.
164. Id. at 581-82. In one case, all residents of Tampa, Florida, received adult programming for two weeks due to a "technological anomaly that was triggered by certain
weather conditions." Id. at 581. In a second case, the Playboy Channel mysteriously appeared in place of a "Rin Tin Tin" movie on the Disney Channel. Id. at 582. Third, a
"scrambled" adult channel was insufficiently scrambled; sound could be heard and, occasionally, a picture could be seen. Id.
165. The ludicrous nature of this argument can be seen by considering its application
to the following scenario: 10,000 records labeled as Lawrence Welk's "World's Greatest
Polkas" mistakenly contained songs by the Sex Pistols, including "I Want to Be Your
Dog." The record company reported receiving "several dozen" irate calls from those
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"that is entirely suitable for adults" to achieve a "marginal degree of protection.mes The Supreme Court has struck down similarly excessive regulations that would limit speech between willing adults and that lacked reasonable restriction to the harm
addressed. 187 Using another porcine analogy, the Court has
warned us not "to burn the house to roast the pig. " 168
A federal judge has offered an alternate objection to lock
boxes as the remedy for indecent cable programming, which
again applies equally to addressable converters. 189 This objection
notes that lock boxes require advance planning and thereby fail
to protect those who scan from channel to channel and whose
viewing of a given channel is "unplanned and incomplete." 170 A
cable operator can alleviate this problem simply by notifying a
new subscriber of the channels likely to contain occasionally "offensive" programming. m Thus, the subscriber who wants to
avoid the "single blow" of indecent programming can block out
those channels from the · startm and still receive many other
channels, such as broadcast channels, as well as special news and
"family" channels. 173 Such a subscriber will be able to "scan"
without fear of encountering offensive programming; if a desired
program will appear on one of the "suspect" channels, the subcomplaining that the language was "awful ... typical of a rock group." Welk Disks'
Mislabeling Isn't Just a Vicious Rumor, Wall St. J., Feb. 25, 1987, at 4, col. 1. Under the
anti-lock box argument, no records could contain "indecent language" to spare the sensibilities of those who might be offended if this unlikely technological mishap were to
recur.
166. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Co., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983).
167. See id. (striking down ban on unsolicited mailed contraceptive advertisements);
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (striking down a law barring the sale to
adults of reading material that was "unsuitable" for children).
168. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 74 n.27 (quoting Butler, 352 U.S. at 383).
169. Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989, 1006 (10th Cir. 1986) (Baldock, J., concurring),
summarily aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1559 (1987).
170. Id.
171. Such channels might include not only "adult" channels, such as the Playboy
channel, but movie channels, such as Home Box Office, that periodically show R-rated
movies and, perhaps, access channels on which cable operator censorship is prohibited.
See infra text accompanying notes 261-67.
172. Thus, cable viewers will receive even more protection than postal patrons who
are only "able to avoid the information in [offensive] advertisements after one exposure." Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Co., 463 U.S. 60, 78 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
173. Channels designed especially for children include the Disney Channel and
Nickelodeon.
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scriber can easily unlock the lock box or, in the case of addressable converters, notify the operator to allow the channel
through. 174
If lock boxes and addressable converters can protect both unwilling listeners and unsupervised children, then no justification
exists for a total ban on indecent cable programming. It would,
therefore, not matter whether indecent cable programming was
offered on the "basic tier" 1711 provided to all subscribers, or to a
higher tier for which subscribers pay an extra fee. For either
tier, individual subscribers have the technological power to restrict programming for their homes.
Some have suggested that, even if a total ban on indecent programming is unconstitutional, regulation could simply channel
the indecency to a later time period. 178 According to one proponent of this approach, though such channelling would not protect late night viewers, it would at least protect many
households. 177
This proposal contains a major flaw because it ignores the basic constitutional principle that "[o]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged
on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place." 178
Time-channelling would prevent adults from viewing constitutionally protected programming during daytime and early evening hours, the only time some adults have available for watching television. 179 Government simply cannot use channelling to
limit access to protected speech, absent narrow exceptions that
do not apply to regulation of indecency on cable television.
174. It has also been argued that "the unwanted complexity these devices introduce
into television viewing is attested to by their lack of use." Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d
989, 1006 (10th Cir. 1986) (Baldock, J., concurring), summarily aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1559
(1987). One estimate is that fewer than one percent of cable subscribers have purchased
lock boxes. Id. at 1003. This conclusory statement ignores the myriad other possibilities
for lack of use, including general subscriber satisfaction with programming and lack of
publicity of the availability of the devices. Additionally, an addressable system, requiting
only a telephone call to the cable operator, creates no such complexity.
175. See Cable Act§ 602(2), 47 U.S.C. § 522(2).
176. See Jones, 800 F.2d at 1007 (Baldock, J., concurring) (stating that such channelling would be constitutional).
177. Id. at 1006.
178. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975) (quoting
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)).
179. Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 774 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(stating that alternatives to afternoon broadcasts "involve[d) the expenditure of money,
time, and effort that many of those wishing to hear Mr. Carlin's message may not be able
to afford"); Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 749 F.2d 113, 121 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that channelling "dial-a-porn" telephone service to late hours "denies access to
adults between certain hours").
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For example, a content-neutral regulation that governs all
speech may constitutionally impose time, place, or manner restrictions. Thus, the Court has upheld a restriction limiting the
distribution and sale of religious material at a state fair to assigned booths because the rule "applies evenhandedly to all who
wish to distribute and sell written materials or to solicit
funds." 180 By contrast, the Court struck down a ban on the inclusion by a public utility of discussions of controversial issues
in its billing envelopes because the prohibition was not contentneutral.181 The channelling of only "indecent" cable programming resembles the billing envelope restriction and similarly
does not constitute content-neutral regulation.
The Supreme Court has permitted the zoning of sexually-oriented movie houses, yet categorized such zoning as content-neutral because the regulations did not aim at the content of the
films, but at the secondary effects of such theaters. 182 These
cases do not apply, however, to an analysis of the regulation of
cable programming. Even when upholding such zoning, the
Court has reaffirmed prior holdings that regulation is impermissible when "the justifications offered by the city rested primarily
on the city's interest in protecting its citizens from exposure to
unwanted, 'offensive' speech."183 Because indecent cable programming creates no secondary effects to either a city, neighborhood, or individual home and because the possible exposure to
unwanted "offensive" speech presents its only "effect,"184 such
programming may not be "zoned" to a late night time slot. 1811
180. Heffron v. Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981).
181. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 544 (1980).
182. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). The "secondary effects" that motivated the city of Renton, Washington, included crime prevention, protection of the city's
retail trade, maintenance of property values, and general protection and preservation of
the quality of the city's neighborhoods and commercial districts. Renton, 475 U.S. at 48;
see also Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.34 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
183. Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.34 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (distinguishing zoning
of movie houses from a ban on nudity in movies shown at drive-in theaters held facially
invalid in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.s·. 205 (1975)). Professor Nimmer has
termed the Young-Erznoznik distinction, "the difference between a non-speech restriction and an anti-speech restriction." M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 2-99
(1984).
184. See, e.g., Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989, 1006 (10th Cir. 1986) (Baldock, J.,
concurring) (stating that diverse programming should be available to all cable subscribers, regardless of whether they object to "patently offensive indecent material being
presented during family viewing hours").
185. Cases upholding laws requiring that the covers of sexually oriented publications
displayed for sale be concealed if they could be seen by minors, Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1985); M.S. News Co. v.
Casado, 721 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1983), also do not apply to cable programming. Not
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Such channelling also fails to represent the least restrictive
means for advancing the goal of ensuring that the opportunity to
enjoy the diversity of programming offered by cable television is,
in the words of one judge, "available to all who are willing to
subscribe, even those who object to patently offensive indecent
material being presented during family viewing hours.,,. 88 The
technology of cable television-specifically, lock boxes and addressable converters-permits the protection of this objecting
subscriber without infringing on the rights of non-objecting
subscribers. 187
Accordingly, any governmental attempt to limit the hours that
a cable operator may offer constitutionally protected indecent
programming must be struck down, just as a total ban would be.
Each proposed limitation on speech, however valid the underlying governmental purpose, is "not reasonably restricted to the
evil with which it is said to deal.m 88

B.

The Legislative Solution

The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984189 created a
complex scheme for regulating pornography on cable television.
Congress attempted to balance the competing interests of those
who wished to keep such programming out of their homes with
the first amendment rights of programmers and willing viewonly does uncertainty over the constitutionality of these laws continue, American Booksellers Ass'n v. Virginia, 792 F.2d 1261 (4th Cir. 1986), prob. juris. noted, 55 U.S.L.W.
3569 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1987); Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass'n, 780 F.2d at 1399-1406
(Lay, C.J., dissenting), but these laws are far less restrictive of first amendment rights
than limiting the hours for viewing certain cable programs. The display limitations do
not limit the ability of an adult who wishes to buy and read the publication from doing
so whenever convenient: "adults are still able to view any of the material in a free and
unfettered fashion by purchasing it." Id. at 1395. By contrast, the limit on cable programming absolutely prevents adults from viewing the programming when they desire.
Additionally, although the display ban has been characterized as "a reasonable means of
attempting to control the merchandising to minors of sexually explicit material obscene
as to them," id. at 1396, the existence of technological means for controlling minors'
access to objectionable cable programming, see supra text accompanying notes 156-58,
renders the time limitation an "unreasonable means" for furthering the governmental
interest.
186. Jones, 800 F.2d at 1006 (Baldock, J., concurring).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 156-58.
188. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957); see also Frisby v. Scultz, 108 S. Ct.
2495, 2502 (1988) (stating that regulations must be narrowly tailored to protect only
unwilling recipients of the communications") (emphasis added).
189. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (Supp. III
1985) and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 47 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.).
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ers. 190 To protect the unwilling viewer, Congress mandated that
the cable operator make "lock boxes" available to block out possibly offensive programming. The statute contains a complex
scheme for regulating program content, which includes a variety
of standards that depend on whether the material is "obscene"
or "indecent" and on whether programming is offered on channels within the cable operator's editorial control or on access
channels. The heart of the balance, however, provides that, except for obscenity, the speaker shall not be silenced, the willing
viewer shall receive the programming, and the unwilling viewer
shall be protected by technology, not by the censor.
1. The Right Not to See- In drafting the Cable Act, Congress was "extremely concerned" about the cablecasting of sexually explicit material, especially to children. 191 At the same time,
Congress recognized that the first amendment precludes a system of governmental censorship of cable programming. 192
Although permitting franchising authorities to ban obscene
material completely, 193 Congress devised a method for dealing
with indecent, but not obscene, material. 194 Section 624 of the
Act requires that all cable operators make available to their subscribers the technological means for blocking out particular
cable channels: "In order to restrict the viewing of programming
which is obscene or indec~nt, upon the request of a subscriber, a
cable operator shall provide (by sale or lease) a device by which
the subscriber can prohibit viewing of a particular cable service
during periods selected by that subscriber."1911
The requirement of so-called lock boxes demonstrates the
congressional desire to protect the right to avoid certain kinds of
programming in the home without restricting the rights of those
who wish to receive the programs. Congress considered these devices a solution to the thorny cable indecency problem, stating
that a lock box requirement "provides one means to effectively
restrict the availability of such programming, particularly with
respect to child viewers, without infringing the First Amend190. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 69, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 4706.
191.

Id.

192.

Id.

193.

See infra text accompanying notes 199-203.

194. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 69, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 4707.
195.

§ 624(d)(2)(A), 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2)(A).
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ment rights of the cable operator, the cable programmer, or
other cable viewers." 196
2. Obscenity and the Cable Act- All levels of government
may ban obscene cable programming under the Cable Act. Section 639 makes it a federal criminal offense, subject to a $10,000
fine or imprisonment for up to two years, to transmit obscene
programming over a cable system; 197 section 638 permits state
and local governments to impose civil and criminal liability for
the cablecasting of obscene programming; 198 section 624 permits
franchising authorities to include in a franchise agreement either
a ban on, or restrictions covering, obscene programming. 199
When using the term "obscene" in these sections, Congress explicitly adopted the Miller v. California obscenity standard. 200
Some confusion exists over whether a franchising authority
may permit obscene programming. Section 624 states that a
franchising authority may specify in a franchise that obscene
programming "shall not be provided or shall be provided subject
to conditions." As the Commission on Pornography points out,
however, "Section [624] seems to contemplate allowing the operator to provide obscene programming while Section [639] makes
196. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 70, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 4707. In an interpretive rule, the FCC attempted to undo this balance
by stating that a cable operator need only provide a lock box able to block out "any
channel over which [the cable operator] has editorial control," but not public and commercial access channels. Amendment of Parts 1, 63, and 76 of the Commission's Rules to
Implement the Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637,
18,655 (1985) [hereinafter Implementation]. Time on commercial access channels is
leased to programmers who are not affiliated with the cable operator; "PEG" channels
are those used for public, educational, and governmental access programming. See infra
discussion accompanying notes 246-48.
In ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the court stated that there was
"no discernible basis in the statute or the legislative history" for the exclusion of these
channels and ordered the FCC to delete its "improper suggestion." Thus, cable operators
must provide a lock box capable of blocking all channels, including access channels.
197. Cable Act § 639, 47 U.S.C. § 559.
198. Cable Act§ 638, 47 U.S.C. § 558. A "franchising authority" is the governmental
authority empowered to issue a cable franchise. § 602(9), 47 U.S.C. § 522(9). Although
this regulation is usually done by cities, H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 23, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4660, some states, such as Rhode
Island, retain control of the franchising process. See RI. GEN. LAWS § 39-19-3 (1984).
199. Cable Act § 624, 47 U.S.C. § 544.
200. See H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 69, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS, at 4706 ("The Committee adopts the Supreme Court's obscenity formulation as set down in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)."). For the definition of the
Miller standard, see supra note 8. Even though viewers watch cable programming in the
home, the right of privacy established in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), would
not protect transmission of obscene programming because the transmission originates
outside the home. See United States v. 12 200-ft Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 127-28
(1973).
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it a crime to do so."201 Thus, the question becomes whether a
local franchising authority can permit, albeit subject to conditions, programming that federal law would otherwise bar.
If the programming expressly permitted by the local government would still be subject to federal criminal penalties, the
statutory language "or shall be provided subject to conditions"
would be meaningless. Although it would be unusual to allow a
local government to immunize conduct from federal stricture,
the field of obscenity regulation might be the area of law where
such immunization makes the most sense. Perhaps Congress,
aware of the importance of judging obscenity by "community
standards,"202 has decided to permit each community to have
the final say on whether to allow, within its borders, cable programs that might meet the definition of "obscene."203 Thus, a
program permitted by the local franchising authority would be
protected against charges of violating the federal obscenity
provision.
3. Is Indecency Prohibited?- Whether the Cable Act bans
"indecent" cable programs and permits local governments to
ban such programs presents an even more difficult question.
Section 639 criminalizes the cablecasting of programs that are
"obscene or otherwise unprotected by the Constitution of the
United States." 20• Similarly, section 624 permits franchising authorities to include provisions in their franchise agreement that
bar, or subject to conditions, the cablecasting of programming
201. 1 CoMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 1, at 485; see also Meyerson, The Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984: A Balancing Act on the Coaxial Wires, 19 GA. L.
REv. 543, 599 n.327 (1985).
202. See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974):
{A] 'community' approach may well result in material being proscribed as obscene in one community but not in another . . . . But communities throughout
the Nation are in fact diverse, and it must be remembered that, in cases such as
this one, the Court is confronted with the task of reconciling conflicting rights of
the diverse communities within our society and of individuals.
Id. at 107 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200-01 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added)); see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973) ("People in
different States vary in their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity.").
203. Cf. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977). Though holding that the lack of
a state obscenity law would not bar federal prosecution for sending obscenity through
the mails in that state, the Court stated:
Even though the State's law is not conclusive with regard to the attitudes of the
local community on obscenity, nothing we have said is designed to imply that
the Iowa statute should not have been introduced into evidence . . . . On the
contrary, the local statute on obscenity provides relevant evidence of the mores
of the community whose legislative body enacted the law.
Id. at 307-08.
204. Cable Act § 639, 47 U.S.C. § 559.
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that is "obscene or ... otherwise unprotected by the Constitution of the United States."2011
Congress did not explicitly define the phrase "otherwise unprotected" contained in these two sections. Furthermore, the
House Report gives only two specific examples of this "otherwise
unprotected" speech: "fighting words" and speech presenting "a
'clear and present danger' to public order."206 In its discussion of
indecency, however, the Report noted that the Supreme Court
had upheld the indecency standard for broadcasting in Pacifica,
but that lower courts had struck down the standard when applied to cable. 207 Without taking a stand on the proper constitutional standard for cable television, the Report stated that the
statutory language "would also permit changing constitutional
interpretations to be incorporated into the standard set forth in
[section] 624(d)(l), should those judicial interpretations at some
point in the future deem additional standards, such as indecency, constitutionally valid as applied to cable."208
Congress's apparent attempt to create a flexible standard, one
that will encompass ·indecent programming if and only if permitted to do so by "judicial interpretation" of the Constitution,
contains several major problems. 209 First, even in Pacifica, the
Court did not say that indecency was "unprotected by the Constitution."210 The Court held that indecent broadcasts could be
205. Cable Act § 624(d)(l), 47 U.S.C. § 544 (d)(l). The Act establishes a different
regulatory scheme for programming shown on public and commercial access channels.
See infra text accompanying notes 261-79.
206. HR REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 69, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 4706.
207. See id. at 69-70, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AoMIN. NEWS at 4706-07
(discussing Cruz v. Ferre, 571 F. Supp. 125 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Community Television, Inc.
v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah 1982); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531
F. Supp. 987 (D. Utah 1982)).
208. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 69, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CoDE CoNG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 4706 (emphasis added). The House Report, in discussing the federal
penalties imposed by § 639, does not use the word "indecency," but instead states that
the penalties apply to "pornographic programming." Id. at 95, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CoNG. & AoMIN. NEWS at 4732.
Though the House Report never states that the federal criminal provision of § 639
and the regulatory provision of§ 624(d)(l) have the same meaning, it is probably safe to
assume that Congress intended the phrase "obscene or otherwise unprotected by the
Constitution" to have the same meaning in both sections.
209. The House Report does not indicate to which level of court the phrase "judicial
interpretation" refers. Id. at 69, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
4706. If a state or federal district court permits regulation of cable indecency, will that
interpretation rewrite the statute, even if other courts disagree? In the name of certainty, at least, the only "judicial" interpretation that could matter would be that of the
United States Supreme Court.
210. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion)
("Although [indecent] words ordinarily lack literary, political, or scientific value, they are
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regulated despite their protection under the Constitution. Thus,
even if the Supreme Court were to hold that the rationale in
Pacifica could be applied in toto to cable television, thus permitting the regulation of the appearance of indecency on cable, the
literal statutory language of the Cable Act prohibiting (or permitting regulation of) "unprotected" speech still would not encompass indecency. 211
A second problem is practical: the application of an "indecency" standard would bar much popular programming. As one
member of the Commission on Pornography noted:
[I]f the "indecency" standard currently in force with regard to broadcast television were also imposed on cable
television, most of the mainline Hollywood films currently on view in theaters across the country could not be
shown on home television served by cable. It is hardly
likely, even inconceivable, that the courts . . . would uphold such an extension of the indecency standard to
cable television. 212
A final, and related, problem comes from the question of
whether section 639, a federal criminal provision, is unconstitutionally vague. It is hardly likely that Congress intended cable
operators throughout the country to read section 639 as suddenly prohibiting them from presenting "most of the mainline
Hollywood films." 213 Yet it remains unclear how else courts
would apply an "indecency" standard to cable programming.
This uncertainty violates the precept issued by the Supreme
Court: "[C]riminal statutes must be so precise and unambiguous
that the ordinary person can know how to avoid unlawful connot entirely outside the protection of the First Amendment."); cf. Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) ("This much has been categorically settled by the Court, that
obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.").
211. Brenner and Price have pointed out that Congress took the phrase "otherwise
unprotected" from an earlier version of a bill that later evolved into the Cable Act. D.
BRENNER & M. PRICE, supra note 137, § 6.09 [3J[c), at 6-95 n.46 (citing S. 66, as reported
by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, S. REP. No. -67,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983)). The report accompanying that bill stressed that "otherwise
unprotected" did not mean indecency, but material such as child pornography that was
unprotected, even if not obscene. Id; see, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
212. 1 CoMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 1, at 104 (statement of Father Bruce
Ritter).
213. Home Box Office, the most popular movie channel, with over 14 million subscribers, Cable Services Subscriber Count, CABLEVISION Sept. 29, 1986, at 64, shows
many films containing "indecency," including Kramer v. Kramer, Coming Home, The
Deerhunter, and One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest. Krattenmaker & Esterow, supra
note 105, at 612.
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duct.
." 2 u The Court has further stressed that where a criminal law touches on first amendment rights, "government may
regulate ... only with narrow specificity."2111 The Court requires
this heightened degree of specificity in the area of free speech to
avoid any potential chilling effect on constitutionally protected
speech. With a vague statute, speakers may decide that they can
only avoid breaking the law "by restricting their conduct to that
which is unquestionably safe."216
The interpretation of section 639 described in the House Report thus appears too vague to pass constitutional muster. Imagine a cable programmer desiring to present George Carlin
describing the "seven words you can't say on television" or the
movie Carnal Knowledge. 217 A look at section 639 informs programmers that they may not show programming that is "obscene
or otherwise unprotected by the Constitution of the United
States." The term "obscenity," though imprecise, "is a term sufficiently definite in legal meaning to give a defendant notice of
the charge against him."218 The Supreme Court, however, has
found that neither the Carlin monologue nor the movie is "obscene,"219 despite the "vulgar and offensive"220 language contained in the monologue and the nudity and depictions of "ultimate !!!ex acts" 221 presented in the movie.
To determine the legality of presenting the two programs,
then, the programmer must determine whether they qualify as
"otherwise unprotected by the Constitution of the United
States." Because neither program presents fighting words nor a
clear and present danger to society, a programmer must decide
214. United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 693 (1948); see also Musser v. Utah, 333
U.S. 95, 97 (1948) ("Legislation may run afoul of the Due Process Clause because it fails
to give adequate guidance to those who would be law-abiding . . . . ").
215. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); see Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982) (stating that if a "law interferes with the right of free speech or
of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply").
216. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964).
217. Carnal Knowledge was a critically acclaimed 1971 film about "two young college
men, roommates and lifelong friends forever preoccupied with their sex lives." Jenkins v.
Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 158 (1974) (quoting Alpert, Review of Carnal Knowledge, SATURDAY REv., July 3, 1971, at 18).
218. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 119 (1974) (emphasis added). But cf.
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 84 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Any
effort to draw a constitutionally acceptable boundary [for obscenity] must resort to such
indefinite concepts as 'prurient interest,' 'patent offensiveness,' 'serious literary value,'
and the like.").
219. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418
U.S. 153, 161 (1974).
220. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 757 (Powell, J., concurring).
221. Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 161.
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whether section 639 prohibits them because of their "indecency. " 222 It would be utterly impossible for a programmer to
know whether section 639 forbids indecency because Congress
itself did not know. Congress has thus deliberately drafted a
paradigm of vagueness.
Professor Laurence Tribe created the following hypothetical
law to illustrate an unquestionably "patently vague" statute: "It
shall be a crime to say anything in public unless the speech is
protected by the first and fourteenth amendments."223 Though
no legislative body would actually enact Professor Tribe's statute, section 639 accomplishes exactly the same result as would
the statute. By criminalizing the cablecasting of all programming
that is unprotected by the Constitution, Congress has made it "a
crime to say anything [on cable television] unless the speech is
protected by the first and fourteenth amendments."
Both the hypothetical statute and the Cable Act create the
same problem:

[T]he Constitution does not, in and of itself, provide a
bright enough line to guide primary conduct, and ... a
law whose reach into protected spheres is limited only by
the background assurance that unconstitutional applications will eventually be set aside is a law that will deter
too much that is in fact protected. 22"
Thus, to prevent unconstitutional vagueness-to meet the certainty required by the due process clause and to avoid deterring
protected speech-courts and local governments should give a
limiting construction to section 639 and interpret it as only
criminalizing "obscene" speech. 2211
222. The Court in Pacifica did not decide whether the FCC's definition of indecency
as "language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs," Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975), was unconstitutionally vague. Pacifica,
438 U.S. at 742-43. The Court did cite a dictionary definition of "indecent": "Webster
defines the term as 'a: altogether unbecoming: contrary to what the nature of things or
what circumstances would dictate as right or expected or appropriate: hardly suitable:
UNSEEMLY . . . b: not conforming to generally accepted standards of morality; . . .'
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1966)." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 740 n.14
(deletions in original).
223. L. TRIBE, supra note 52, § 12-26, at 716 (emphasis added).
224. Id. (emphasis in original).
225. The Court accomplished a similar construction in Hamling v. United States, 418
U.S. 87, 98, 118 (1974) (interpreting "obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile,"
18 U.S.C. § 1461, as limited to obscenity).
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In sum, the phrase "obscene or otherwise unprotected by the
Constitution," contained in both section 639's criminal offense
provision and section 624's regulatory provision, should be read
to comport both with its plain meaning and with constitutional
requirements. "Indecent" programming, which remains indeed
"protected" by the Constitution, should not be included within
the phrase.
4. Indecency and Preemption- Confusion also exists as to
whether the Cable Act preempts state and local governmental
regulation of cable indecency. The Cable Act prohibits content
regulation by state and local government except where the Act
specifically preserves such power. Section 624(0(1) bars all levels
of government from "imposing requirements regarding the provision or content of cable services, except as expressly provided
in this title." 226 Section 638 preserves the ability of state and
local governments to regulate "libel, slander, obscenity, incitement, invasions of privacy, false and misleading advertising, or
other similar laws." 227 It remains unclear, however, whether section 638 permits local regulation of indecent programming as
wen.22s

The ultimate question in interpreting section 638, of course,
becomes whether indecency is "similar" to obscenity and, thus,
covered by the section. Indecency and obscenity may appear
"similar" in that both involve "offensive" depictions of sex. 229
They remain fundamentally dissimilar, however, in the type of
material they encompass: "Prurient appeal is an element of the
obscene, but the normal definition of 'indecent' merely refers to
nonconformance with accepted standards of morality."230
226. Cable Act § 624(a), 47 U.S.C. § 544(a) (emphasis added); see also Cable Act
§ 636(c), 47 U.S.C. § 556(c) (stating that any law "inconsistent with this Act shall be
deemed to be preempted and superseded").
227. Cable Act§ 638, 47 U.S.C. § 558 (emphasis added).
228. One court has concluded that "the legislative history shows that Sec. 638 does
not preserve state power to regulate indecency." Community Television, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1105 (D. Utah 1985), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d
at 989 (10th Cir. 1986), summarily aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1559 (1987). Nonetheless, the court
immediately contradicted itself by declaring that it must rule on the constitutionality of
indecency laws because ,"the final resolution of the pre-emption question necessarily requires a ruling on first amendment issues." Id. If, however, Congress indeed preempted
local regulation of indecency, there is no need to discuss the constitutionality of such
regulation. It is perfectly logical for Congress to preempt regulation that would otherwise
be permissible. See, e.g., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984) (upholding under the 1934 Communications Act federal preemption of a state ban on liquor
advertisements on cable).
229. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) ("These words offend for the same reasons that obscenity offends.").
230. Id. at 740.
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The legislative history of the Cable Act provides further evidence that Congress did not intend for section 638 to include
"indecency." Although Congress did not use the term "indecency" in section 638, it used the term elsewhere in the statute. 231 As one court commented: "These explicit indecency provisions strongly imply that Congress deliberately omitted
indecency from Sec[tion] 638. It is unlikely that Congress would
accidentally omit indecency from Sec[tion] 638, which defines
important areas of federal, state and local power, and remember
to include indecency in other sections of the Act." 232 Thus, Congress may have intended to combat obscenity by authorizing
state and local criminal and civil penalties in addition to providing federal sanctions. As for indecent programming, perhaps
Congress intended the remedy to be the availability of lock
boxes-a remedy with a less restrictive effect on free speech
interests. 233
Alternatively, Congress may have preferred that negotiations
between the cable operator and the city produce any ban on indecent programming, assuming the constitutionality of any such
ban. Congress could possibly have decided that a franchise negotiated between the cable operator and the municipality represents a more appropriate place for working out difficult areas of
content regulation than a unilaterally imposed state or local law.
In section 624, Congress stressed that both parties have input
into this sort of franchise provision: "Nothing in this title shall
be construed as prohibiting a franchising authority and a cable
231. See, e.g., Cable Act § 624(d)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2) (requiring signal blocking
devices, so-called "lock boxes," to be provided "[i]n order to restrict the viewing of programming which is obscene or indecent . . . . ") (emphasis added); Cable Act § 612(h),
47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (permitting local regulation of programming on commercial access
channels if the programming is "obscene, or is in conflict with community standards in
that it is lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent") (emphasis added).
232. Community Television, 611 F. Supp. at 1104. This analysis is strengthened by
the requirement in one of those "explicit indecency provisions" that every cable operator
make a lock box available to subscribers. § 624(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2). Congress
intended this device, which allows a viewer to "lock out" certain channels and keep them
off the home television screen, to provide "one means to effectively restrict the availability of [indecent] programming, particularly with respect to child viewers." H.R. REP. No.
934, supra note 100, at 70, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4707;
see supra discussion at notes 191-96. Thus, when Congress considered the question of
"indecency," it did so in the context of lock boxes, but not when giving localities the
power to impose liability for programming.
233. This balance is reflected in the language of the House Report that describes lock
boxes as "one means to effectively restrict the availability of such [indecent] programming . . . without infringing the First Amendment rights of the cable operator, the cable
programmer, or other cable viewers." H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 70, reprinted
in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4707.
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company from specifying, in franchise or renewal thereof, that

certain cable services shall not be provided or shall be provided
subject to conditions, if . . . obscene or otherwise unprotected
by the Constitution of the United States."234 This language contr~sts with other sections of the Cable Act, such as those covering public access and franchise renewal, that allow a municipality unilaterally to place certain requirements in the franchise. 2311
Although Senator Goldwater stated that he understood Section 639 to cover indecency "if otherwise constitutionally permissible, "238 his conclusion probably did not represent the intent
of the full Congress. The House Report contains no similar declaration, 237 and Senator Goldwater'.s remarks were not spoken
during congressional debate but were instead inserted afterwards in the Congressional Record. 238 Because of the impossibility of definitively determining whether Congress intended to include "indecency" among the "similar" laws preserved by
section 638, it is probably best to use the reasoning of the Su234. Cable Act § 624(d)(l), 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(l) (emphasis added). It is possible,
however, that§ 624(d)(l) does not encompass indecency either. See supra text accompanying notes 204-25.
235. See Cable Act § 611(b), 44 U.S.C. § 53l(b) ("A franchising authority may in its
request for proposals require as part of franchise . . . that channel capacity be designated for public, educational, or governmental use . . . .") (emphasis added);
§ 626(b)(2), 47 U.S.C. § 546 (b)(2) (requiring proposals for franchise renewal to "contain
such material as the franchising authority may require, including proposals for an upgrade of the cable system") (emphasis added).
236. 130 CONG. REC. Sl4,289 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Goldwater).
237. The House Report states that § 639 preserves:
the criminal or civil liability of cable programmers or cable operators with respect to . . . state and local laws not inconsistent with this title relating to libel,
slander, obscenity, incitement, privacy, false or misleading advertising, or other
similar areas of law. . . .
The Committee does not intend to affect liability which might result from
other speech which may be held by the courts to be unentitled to constitutional
protection (as discussed in relation to § 624(d)).
H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 95, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CooE CONG. & AoMIN.
NEWS at 4732 (emphasis added).
·
The reference to the earlier discussion can have two meanings. On the one hand, that
discussion of § 624(d) did say that "obscenity" in § 624 will include "indecency" if the
courts permit. Id. at 69, reprinted in 1984 U.S. ConE CONG. & AnMIN. NEWS at 4706. On
the other hand, if the earlier discussion is meant simply to illustrate unprotected speech
"other" than those (such as obscenity) that the preceding sentence listed, the reference
would be to unprotected speech such as "fighting words" and that posing a "clear and
present danger" to the public order. Id. The House Report discussion of "other" speech,
therefore, does not establish whether Congress intended to include "indecency" within
§ 638.
238. Community Television, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1105 (D. Utah
1985), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), summarily aff'd,
107 S. Ct. 1559 (1987).
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preme Court in other cases involving obscenity laws written in
unclear language:
[W]e do have a duty to authoritatively construe federal
statutes where a "serious doubt of constitutionality is
raised" and "a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided." If and when
a "serious doubt" is raised as to the vagueness of [statutory language]. . . we are prepared to construe such
terms as limiting regulated material to patently offensive
representations or descriptions of that specific "hard
core" sexual conduct given as examples in Miller v. California. Of course, Congress could always define other specific "hard core" conduct. 239
A "serious doubt" does exist as to the constitutionality of regulating indecent cable programming; 240 in fact, Congress expressed such doubts while drafting the Cable Act. 2 " 1 Additionally, there is a construction of section 638 that avoids the
question of its constitutionality. Accordingly, the vague statutory language, "libel, slander, obscenity, incitement, invasions of
privacy, false and misleading advertising, or other similar laws,"
contained in section 638 should be read to preserve local authority to regulate speech over cable television only if Congress understood such regulation to be constitutional when it drafted the
Cable Act in 1984. Indecency, omitted from the statutory list,
would not be subject to state and local regulation, unless and
until Congress decided to add it to its list.
5. Access: Regulating the Electronic Soapbox- In drafting
the Cable Act, Congress sought to protect the cable operator's
right of free expression when presenting programming to the
239. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 113 (1974) (quoting United States v. 12
200-ft Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973)) (citations omitted). In Hamling, the
Court construed the language in 18 U.S.C. § 1461 barring "obscene, lewd, indecent,
filthy or vile" material from the mails as limited "to patently offensive representations or
descriptions of that specific 'hard core' sexual conduct given as examples in Miller v.
California." Hamling, 418 U.S. at 114. The Court refused to place a similar limitation on
statutory language in Pacifica. This holding does not affect the interpretation of § 638,
because, the Pacifica statute, unlike § 638, expressly included the word "indecent."
("Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication . . . . " 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976) (emphasis added)). As the Pacifica Court stated,
"The plain language of the statute does not support [a limiting interpretation]. The
words 'obscene, indecent, or profane' are written in the disjunctive, implying that each
has a separate meaning." FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 739-40 (1978).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 107-88.
241. See H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 69-70, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4706-07; see also supra text accompanying notes 207-08.
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public;242 yet Congress remained equally concerned with protecting the rights of the members of a community to communicate
via the cable system. Congress recognized that the technology of
cable television could, for the first time, provide the public with
effective access to a medium of mass communication, without infringing on the first amendment rights of the "owner" of the medium. 243 Congress thus included third party access requirements
in the Cable Act to ensure that many speakers would be able to
communicate through a cable system, and that the single cable
operator in town would not be able to exercise unlimited power
as gatekeeper over the entire cable system. Congress stated that
access requirements, like antitrust laws, 244 constitute "structural
regulations" that limit concentration of media control and increase the diversity of information sources, without imposing
governmental control of content. 245
The Cable Act provides two ways for parties unaffiliated with
the cable operator to obtain access to the cable system: public
access channels that the franchise agreement itself can require, 246 and commercial access, which the Cable Act mandates
for systems with thirty-six or more channels. 247 A major difference between these two forms of access is that the cable operator
traditionally provides channel time on public access free of
242. See id. at 69, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4706 (stating
that § 624 bars franchising authorities from requiring cable operators to carry "a particular news service, a specific program, etc.").
243. One of the greatest challenges over the years in establishing communications
policy has been assuring access to the electronic media by people other than the licensees
or owners of those media. The development of cable television, with its abundance of
channels, can provide the public and program providers the meaningful access that, up
until now, has been difficult to obtain. Id. at 30, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 4667.
244. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) ("Freedom of
the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction
repression of that freedom by private interests.").
245. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 32, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 4669. The most recent court case has found cable access rules to be
constitutional. Berkshire Cablevision, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976 (D. R.I. 1983), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985). But see Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571
F.2d 1025, 1055-56 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (stating in
dictum that the access rules imposed by the FCC were unconstitutional).
246. Cable Act § 611, 47 U.S.C. § 531. The franchise can also set aside channels for
educational and governmental access. Id.
247. Cable Act § 612, 47 U.S.C. § 532. A system with between 36 and 54 activated
channels-that is, channels available for use-must set aside 10% of its channels (not
counting those whose use federal law and regulation mandate or prohibit). A system with
between 55 and 100 channels must set aside 15% of such channels. A system with more
than 100 channels must set aside 15% of all channels. Cable Act § 612(b), 47 U.S.C.
§ 532(b).
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charge, while commercial acc~ss users must pay a rate negotiated with the cable operator. 248
a. The cable operator and access- Before the passage of the
Cable Act, many cable operators tried to keep obscene or indecent programming off both kinds of access channels by prescreening programming. Cable companies justified this practice as
necessary to determine whether the programming would subject
the cable system to legal liability for transmitting obscene or indecent programming. 249 Past FCC practice made cable operators
justifiably apprehensive about the possible imposition of such liability. In the 1970's, FCC regulations had expressly made cable
operators liable for obscene and indecent access programs, requiring them to keep such programming off the access channels. 2110 The FCC's rules required operators to prescreen any programs suspected of including "questionable" programming and
to refuse to allow the airing of the program if the programmer
refused to delete the "offending portion."21n The FCC also told
operators that they might have to bar offending programmers
from using the channel "for a considerable length of time. " 2112
In 1978, the Eighth Circuit struck down the FCC rules. 2113 The
court found the rules fatally flawed because they "created a
corps of involuntary government surrogates, but without providing the procedural safeguards respecting 'prior restraint' re248. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 48, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 4685.
249. 1 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, CABLE TELEVISION LAW 11 15.07(1), at 15-15
(1987) (noting that cable operators viewed this practice as necessary "solely for the purpose of determining whether transmission will subject the system to legal liability") (emphasis added); see also D. BRENNER & M. PRICE, supra note 137, § 6.04(6], at 6-40 n.48
(describing required prescreening by cable operator in Evanston, Illinois); Hofbauer,
"Cableporn" and the First Amendment: Perspectives on Content Regulation of Cable
Television, 35 FED. COMM. L. J. 139, 189-90 (1983) (describing how New York City's Police Department Public Morals Squad put "pressure" on local cable company to censor
access program containing "adult entertainment").
250. Clarification of § 76.256 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, 59
F.C.C.2d 984 (1976).
251. Id. at 985.
252. Id. Such a requirement would be an unconstitutional prior restraint. See Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 504 (1962) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that it was
unconstitutional to allow "the Postmaster General to exclude all matter sent by a person
who had previously sent violative material"); see also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931).
253. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1056-57 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd on
other grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979). The Eighth Circuit also found the FCC's access rules
to be beyond the scope of the agency's regulatory power and a violation of the cable
operator's first amendment rights. 571 F.2d at 1035-56. The Supreme Court affirmed
solely on the ground that the rules exceeded the FCC's statutory authority. 440 U.S. at
709.
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quired by the government." 2 M The Supreme Court has required
strict procedural safeguards to reduce the risk that regulation of
obscenity will lead to a burdening of protected expression. 2 n
Any plan for administrative review of material for obscenity
must: (1) require prompt judicial review of all administrative determinations of obscenity; (2) place the burdens on the censor of
initiating review and of proving the material is unprotected; and
(3) limit any administrative restraint on the material to the
shortest time necessary for obtaining a final judicial review.2&6
For a regulatory scheme for access channels to be constitutional under the Court's guidelines, therefore, the government
must ensure that the final determination as to whether an access
program may be cablecast rests with the independent judiciary.2117 The censoring authority would bear the burdens of bringing the program before the judiciary as quickly as possible and
proving that the program met the legal definition of obscenity.
These are indeed heavy burdens. The Supreme Court has deliberately placed them on governments that are regulating nonprotected speech to "ensure against the curtailment of constitutionally protected expression, which is often separated from
obscenity only by a dim and uncertain line."2118 Furthermore,
governments may not avoid this constitutional mandate by requiring that a nongovernmental party do the censoring. 2119 In
1981, the FCC recognized that its requirements for censorship of
access programming by cable operators lacked the necessary
procedural safeguards and removed its rules imposing liability
on operators for such programming. 260
254. Midwest Video Corp., 571 F.2d at 1056.
255. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963); see also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958) ("The separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for ... sensitive tools . . . . ").
256. Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 562 (1975) (concerning access
to municipal theater); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 417 (1971) (discussing regulation of
the mails); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-60 (1965) (considering motion picture
censorship). These requirements are often referred to as "Freedman requirements," after
the first case to enunciate them.
257. "Because the censor's business is to censor, there inheres the danger that he
may well be less responsive than a court-part of an independent branch of government-to the constitutionally protected interests in free expression." Freedman, 380
U.S. at 57-58.
258. Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 66.
259. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1009 (1982) (holding that one indicium of
state action is whether private action has been "dictated by any rule of conduct imposed
by the State").
260. Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning
the Cable Television Channel Capacity and Access Channel Requirements of § 76.251,
87 F.C.C.2d 40, 42 (1981) ("(A] rule which requires the cable system operator to censor
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In drafting the Cable Act, Congress agreed that protecting
free speech rights over access channels requires that cable operators not interfere with access programming whether in response
to governmental edict or on their own accord. Congress declared
that "separat[ing] editorial control over a limited number of
cable channels from the ownership of the cable system itself . . .
is fundamental to the goal of providing subscribers with the diversity of information sources intended by the First Amendment."261 To assure that cable systems "provide the widest possible diversity of information sources and services to the
public,"262 the Cable Act explicitly bars cable operators from
censoring or exercising any control over the content of access
programming. 263 Congress stated that such freedom was integral
to the concept of the use of access channels. 264 Congress
designed the Cable Act to prevent a recurrence of the situation
where the cable operator had the power to limit the access
programmer's first amendment rights. 266 To remove the need for
censorship, Congress specifically provided that cable operators
could not be found legally liable for the content of access programming. 266 Thus, for access channels, the law now regards the
role of the cable operator as similar to that of a telegraph or
telephone company-simply the owner of the wires that the
public will use for transmitting information: "With regard to the
access requirement, cable operators act as . . . conduits. They
do not exercise their editorial discretion over the programming
"267
programming on a channel set aside as a public forum, to which the programmer has a
right of access by virtue of local, state or federal law, would impose a system of prior
restraint in violation of the Freedman requirement."); accord Midwest Video Corp. v.
FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1056-57 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
See generally supra text accompanying note 256 (describing the Freedman requirements). The FCC deleted its obscenity rules in 1985, as superseded by the Cable Act.
Implementation, supra note 196, at 18,656.
261. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 31, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 4668.
262. Cable Act § 601(4), 47 U.S.C. § 521(4).
263. Sections 611(e) and 612(c)(2) prohibit cable operators from exercising editorial
control over public and commercial access channels, respectively. 47 U.S.C. §§ 531(e),
532(c)(2).
264. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 47, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 4684.
265. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1057 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other
grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (describing the situation as one where "the cable operator
[served as] both judge and jury, and subjected the cable user's First Amendment rights
to decision by an unqualified private citizen").
266. Cable Act § 638, 47 U.S.C. § 558.
267. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 35, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 4672. One peculiar bit of legislative drafting might appear to contradict
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The Cable Act thus protects the operators from liability for
access programming, and provides that operators may only act
this image of cable operators as conduits for access programming. The Cable Act states:
"Subject to section 624(d), a cable operator shall not exercise any editorial control over
any public, educational, or governmental use of channel capacity provided pursuant to
this section." Cable Act § 611(e), 47 U.S.C. § 531(e) (emphasis added). It might seem
that § 624(d) would contain the exception to the ban on operator editorial control over
access. Section 624(d), however, consists of two subsections, neither of which give the
operator any editorial control.
Section 624(d)(l) states that the Cable Act does not bar "a franchising authority and a
cable operator from specifying, in a franchise or renewal thereof, that certain cable services shall not be provided or shall be provided subject to conditions, if . . . obscene or
... otherwise unprotected by the Constitution of the United States." Cable Act
§ 624(d)(l), 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(l) (emphasis added). Section 624(d)(2) requires cable
operators to make lock boxes available to subscribers. See supra text accompanying
notes 191-96. The phrase, "specifying, in a franchise . . . that certain cable services shall
not be provided," should not be interpreted to permit a franchising authority to require
an operator to censor "obscene" access programs. Not only would such a requirement
subject the operator to the stringent procedural demands imposed on governmentally
authorized censors, see supra text accompanying notes 255-56, it would eliminate an important protection provided in the Cable Act for the cable operator-the provision that
cable operators cannot be held liable by federal, state, or local government for any programming, including obscenity, shown on access channels. Cable Act § 638, 47 U.S.C.
§ 558. Congress explained this provision by noting that the law "prohibits the operator's
editorial control over all such channels." H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 95, reprinted in 1984 U.S. ConE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4732. Liability may still be imposed,
however, on the producers of access programs and on anyone, including a cable operator,
who "exercise[s) control over the content of programs." Id. Any exercise of power over
access programming by an operator would thus remove the protection from liability created by Congress. It is unlikely that Congress intended to contradict itself and expose
cable operators to liability for access programming when it permitted "specifying in a
franchise" that obscene programming would not be shown. See D. BRENNER & M. PRICE,
supra note 137, § 6.04[5), at 6-39.
The Cable Act prohibits all editorial control over access by the operator. See supra
text accompanying notes 244-68. Section 624(d)(l), therefore, should not be read as permitting a franchising authority to require that a cable operator exercise "editorial control" over access programming by deciding which programs meet the definition of "obscene." Moreover, § 624(d)(l) can be given a far more plausible interpretation: a
franchising authority may "specify" in the franchise agreement that programming that
has previously been judicially determined to be "obscene" shall not be shown on the
access channel. This would not place the cable operator in the prohibited position of
censor. Rather, the operator would merely enforce a judicial determination that the programming is obscene.
Section 624(d)(l) can also be given "a literal reading"-permitting a franchise that
"specifies" that obscene programming not be shown and thereby binding both signatories, the franchising authority and the cable operator, to keep such programming off any
channel under their editorial control. See D. BRENNER & M. PRICE, supra note 137,
§ 6.04[5), at 6-39; see also Meyerson, supra note 201, at 602-03.
A final, and not inconsistent, interpretation focuses on the other part of§ 624(d), subsection (d)(2), which requires operators to provide lock boxes. Section 624(d)(l) can be
read to permit a franchise to "specify" that the "lock boxes," which the operator must
provide, be capable of blocking out the access channels. See supra text accompanying
notes 193-96. This would explain the seeming exception to the ban on operator editorial
control over access programming, which stated that the ban was "[s]ubject to § 624(d)."
Cable Act § 611(e), 47 U.S.C. § 53l(e). Under this interpretation, the only control a
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as "conduits" for the provision of access programming. 288 Cable
operators, therefore, no longer have either a reason or the legal
ability to prescreen access programming or exert any other influence over its content.
b. Content control of access programming by the government-As for governmental regulation of access programming,
the Cable Act establishes different limits depending on whether
a program appears on a commercial or public access channel.
The Cable Act apparently gives local governments some control
over the commercial access programming. Section 612(h) states
that programming on these channels:
shall not be provided, or shall be provided subject to conditions, if such cable service in the judgment of the
franchising authority is obscene or is in conflict with
community standards in that it is lewd, lascivious, filthy,
or indecent or is otherwise unprotected by the Constitution of the United States. 269
Although the statutory language, at first reading, may seem to
give the franchising authority broad power to keep both obscene
and indecent programming off the ·commercial access channel,
Congress has supplied its own limiting construction. The House
Report makes clear that the regulatory power conferred by section 612(h) is quite restricted: "[T]his subsection empowers
franchising authorities to prohibit or condition the provision of
cable services which are obscene or otherwise unprotected by the
Constitution. " 27° Congress apparently intended the extraneous
statutory language, "lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent," to be
modified by the phrase, "otherwise unprotected by the Constitution of the United States." Thus, until such time as the Supreme
Court declares this category of speech "unprotected," the statcable operator may exercise over access programming would be to ensure that those subscribers who wished to avoid all "offensive" programming could use the lock boxes, required by§ 624(d), to keep "offensive" access, as well as other programming, out of their
homes. The three suggested interpretations are consistent with one another, and together
they may delimit the ability of franchising authority to turn the cable operator into a
watchdog over access programming.
268. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 35, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 4672; see supra text accompanying notes 242-48. The only exception
might be when there has already been a judicial determination of obscenity. See supra
note 267.
269. Cable Act § 612(h), 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (emphasis added).
270. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 55, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CoNG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 4692. Congress deemed such governmental power necessary because
"leased access channels are not subject to the editorial control of the cable operator." Id.
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ute limits franchising authorities to the regulation of obscene
commercial access programming.
As for public access channels, the Cable Act prohibits local
governments from regulating the content of this programming.
Public access channels are available to the entire community, for
use on a first-come, first-served, nondiscriminatory basis,271 and,
by statutory definition, are "designated for public ... use." 272
Congress referred to public access channels as "the video
equivalent of the speaker's soap box or the electronic parallel to
the printed leaflet."278 These channels constitute a facility that
"the State has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity" and that therefore has the status of a governmentally created public forum. 21• The Supreme Court has held
that freedom of speech is protected within such a forum. 2711 The
Court has required that any governmental content-based regulation be narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest and
contain all necessary procedural safeguards. 276
Although the Cable Act is silent on this issue, the absence of a
public access section comparable to section. 612(h) suggests that
Congress intended no governmental oversight for the public access channels. Similarly, the House Report indicates that Congress intended local governments to have editorial control over
their own so-called government access channels, but not those
channels designed for public use. 277 The Report states, "There is
271. "Generally, public access is thought to be first-come first-served, with some
modest efforts to assure continuity for some users." D. BRENNER & M. PRICE, supra note
137, § 6.04[3][c) at 6-32; see also Cable Television Channel Capacity and Access Channel Requirements Report and Order, 59 F.C.C.2d 294, 328 (1976) (detailing former FCC
access requirements).
272. Cable Act § 602(13)(A), 47 U.S.C. § 522(13)(A).
273. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 30, reprinted in 1984 U.S. ConE CoNG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 4667.
274. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). This
public forum is not one "created for a limited purpose." Id. at 46 n.7. The government
has created it specifically to enable the members of a community to speak. It thus differs
markedly from limited purpose public fora, such as a state university with an educational "mission," Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981), or a military base
with a special need to protect "security." United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985).
275. E.g., Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267-68 (stating that a state university that accommodates student meetings has created a forum for students and "has assumed an obligation
to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable constitutional norms").
276. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46 (holding that when government creates a place
for expressive activity by the public, the government is bound "by the same standards as
apply in a traditional public forum"). See discussion at notes 255-58 for procedures required to regulate the content of speech in a public forum.
277. Section 611 describes three types of access channels: public, educational, and
governmental (PEG channels). Although the statute does not define these terms, public
access channels were obviously meant for the public at large; the House Report stated
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no limitation imposed on a franchising authority's or other governmental entity's control over or use of channels set aside for
governmental purposes. " 278 Because this sentence immediately
follows the Report's statement that section 611(e) bars the cable
operator from all editorial control "of the use of the PEG [public, educational and governmental] channels,"278 it can be inferred that Congress intended the other access channels, especially public access, to be free of supervision by the government,
as well as by the cable operator.
c. Categorizing the entity that runs the access channel-Aside from the cable operator and the municipal government, there is one other party who may feel the temptation to
censor access programming: the entity charged with administering the public access channels. In any system of public access,
some entity must, at minimum, schedule programs and make
sure that the access programs are cablecast. More frequently, access centers receive funding and equipment from the cable company or the municipal government's franchise fee, 280 hire staffs
for training community members in the use of the equipment,
and publicize the use of the channel. 281
Certainly, the Cable Act permits some type of regulation of
the access channel. 282 An access manager may decide to reserve
some time slots for hour versus half-hour programs, or to set
aside some days for series as opposed to onetime programthat public access channels "provide groups and individuals who generally have not had
access to the electronic media with the opportunity to become sources of information in
the electronic marketplace of ideas." HR REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 30, reprinted
in 1984 U.S. CooE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4667. Congress intended the educational
channels to bring "local schools into the home" and governmental access to show "the
public local government at work." Id. The statute does not describe how these latter two
types of channels are to be operated.
278. Id. at 47, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4684 (emphasis
added).
279. Id.
280. See Cable Act § 6ll(c), 47 U.S.C. § 531(c) (permitting franchising authorities to
enforce franchise provisions requiring the cable operator to provide "services, facilities,
or equipment"); § 622(g), 47 U.S.C. § 542(g) (exempting certain costs for access facilities
from the 5% franchise fee ceiling); § 625(e), 47 U.s:c. § 545(e) (barring modification of
franchise requirement for access "services").
281. "All [access] systems need funding, policy, staff, facilities, equipment, channels
for cablecasting the productions, rules and guidelines, and a grievance procedure. Fairly
administered, the result will be an effective public access system that is responsive to all
citizens." Thomas, Municipally Operated Public Access: Another Model to Consider, 8
COMMUNITY TELEVISION REV. 24, 24 (1985).
282. Section 6ll(b) permits franchising authorities to devise "rules and procedures"
for use of the access channels. Cf. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (stating that, in a governmentally created public forum, "[r]easonable
time, place and manner regulations are permissible").
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ming. 288 Similarly, the administrator can establish rules giving
preference to community members284 and preventing any individual or organization from monopolizing channel time. An administrator may even impose some "content" regulation if, for
example, a system has several access channels available and
reserves one for use by senior citizens, one for children's programming, and others for general use. 2811 Such a division would
encourage access use without preventing any individual from
communicating at any given time to the public. 286
It is a different issue entirely, though, when the entity managing the access channel wants to censor the programming, place it
in an unfavorable time slot, or ban it completely because an administrator believes the program is obscene, indecent, or otherwise "offensive." The characterization of the entity will then determine the legality of such censorship.
A tremendous variety of entities currently run access facilities
across the country. These entities can be grouped into three
main categories: (1) cable company-run access centers; (2) municipally run centers, including public institutions such as public
libraries and schools; and (3) not-for-profit management
corporations. 287
The first two categories create little difficulty for determining
the limits of their regulatory power. When the cable company
runs access, 288 the cable operator obviously controls the access
facility. The Cable Act prohibits the cable operator from exert283. D. BRENNER & M. PRICE, supra note 137, § 6.04 [3l[c) at 6-32; see supra note
271.
284. But see RVS Cablevision Corp., 36 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1133 (Cable TV Bur.
1976) (striking down preference for local residents on an access channel as violative of
the 1972 FCC rules mandating nondiscriminatory access).
285. The original franchise for Dallas, providing 30 channels for access, had such a
division. See Meyerson, supra note 201, at 588 n.269.
286. With only one access channel, by contrast, the selection of.which topics could be
discussed in "prime time" would create the equivalent of censorship: ·"To allow a government the choice of permissible subjects for public debate would be to allow that government control over the search for political truth." Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 538 (1980).
287. See generally Buske, Status Report on Community Access Programming on
Cable, in 3 THE CABLE/BROADBAND COMMUNICATIONS BooK 106-07 (M. Hollowell ed.
1983); Taylor & Brand, Access: The Community Connection, in CABLE TV RENEWALS &
REFRANCHISING 81-82 (J. Rice ed. 1983).
288. In Dallas, for example, the cable company, Warner Amex Communications, is in
charge of community access. Sanders, Dallas: Access is alive and well under Cable Company Management, 6 COMMUNITY TELEVISION REV. 15 (1983). Other cities where cable
companies run the access facilities include East Lansing, Michigan; Encino, California;
and Iowa City, Iowa. Buske, supra note 287, at 106.
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ing any editorial control over access programming, 389 and this
prohibition applies equally to the operator's employees who
work at the access center. Similarly, the same constitutional limitations that apply to the governmental franchising authority
apply to any governmental entity that runs access. 290 Once
again, discrimination based on content is prohibited. 291
The nonprofit corporations create a more difficult problem. To
determine the limits of their ability to censor access programming and to discriminate based on a program's content, one
must first determine whether to treat such corporations as cable
operators, governmental entities, or independent private parties.
Both the cable operator and the governmental entity are barred
from censorship,292 but a purely private entity would be free to
exert editorial control, including the right to censor access
programming.
Although the Cable Act does not address the categorization of
nonprofit corporations directly, guidance can be obtained by
asking two related questions. First, would such censorship be
consistent with the Cable Act? Certainly, when Congress described public access as "the video equivalent of the speaker's
soap box or the electronic parallel to the printed leaflet," it envisioned a forum free from censorship. 293 Congress intended liability for constitutionally unprotected speech offered on an access
channel to rest where it rests when the orator speaks from the
soap box-solely on the speaker who violates the law. The second question then becomes: in addition to the individual access
programmer, is the not-for-profit corporation legally liable for
the· programming on the access channels it manages? If so, the
access center must have the ability to censor access programming in order to protect itself; if not, it has no valid reason for
censoring such programming.
To answer this second question, one should look to section
638, which covers the question of liability for access program289. See Cable Act § 611(e), 47 U.S.C. § 531(e); supra text accompanying notes 26367.
290. Raleigh, North Carolina, is an example of a city with a municipally operated
public access system. Thomas, supra note 281, at 24.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 271-79. Before a governmental entity can
attempt to enforce valid obscenity laws by preventing the cablecasting of a particular
access program or by previewing all access programming, all of the Freedman procedural
requirements must be in place. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 261-79.
293. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 30, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Coo& CONG. &
AoMIN. NEWS at 4667. As a soapbox orator, one has "the absolute freedom to advocate
one's own positions." FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984).
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ming. That provision does not mention access organizations.
Rather, it envisions a universe of access programming with only
two species: "cable operators" and "cable programmers." This
section exempts cable operators from liability for access programming and places the liability on "cable programmers."29•
The Cable Act itself does not define the term "cable programmer," but the House Report states that the term includes "all
parties that exercise control over the content of programs, and
would not only include program producers. . . ." 29~ Thus, if an
access center "exercises control of the content of programs," it
would meet the definition of a "cable programmer" and become
subject to liability for all access programming. An access center
that does not exercise editorial control, therefore, would not
qualify as a "cable programmer." Accordingly, that center, like
the "cable operator," would avoid liability for the access programming. Moreover, while access centers are obviously not
cable companies, the two share some definitional features. The
Cable Act contains a rather broad definition of "cable operator:
"[T]he term 'cable operator' means any person or group of persons . . . who otherwise controls or is responsible for, through
any arrangement, the management and operation of such a cable
system."296 Because the not-for-profit corporation is responsible
for the management of at least a few of the channels of the
"cable system," it could well fit this definition. 297
A reasonable statutory interpretation of the Cable Act, then,
would be to treat the access organization, in its role of managing
the access channel and studio, as a "cable operator" for two related sections: section 611(e), barring its editorial control of access programming, and section 638, exempting it from liability
for access programming.
Furthermore, the Constitution may well mandate this interpretation under the "state action" doctrine, insofar as it bars an
access center from censoring access programs or discriminating
based on content. 298 Although any state action analysis contains
294. Cable Act§ 638, 47 U.S.C. § 558.
295. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 95, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 4732.
296. Cable Act § 602(4), 47 U.S.C. § 522(4).
297. This is not to suggest that an access center is a "cable operator" subject to other
sections of the Cable Act (e.g. franchise fees). See Cable Act § 622, 47 U.S.C. § 542.
Rather, because the Act forces a choice between categorizing an access center as a "cable
operator" or "cable programmer," it must be recognized that the access center shares
some features with the statutory definition of cable operator.
298. "Because the [fourteenth amendment] is directed at the States, it can be violated only by conduct that may be fairly characterized as 'state action.' " Lugar v. Ed-

FALL 1987-WINTER 1988]

Cable/Pornography Debate

193

a bit of uncertainty, 299 it appears that not-for-profit corporations
that manage public access facilities meet the criteria for state
action. State or local governments create many of these corporations, including appointment of their original boards of directors, and these corporations continue to receive funding either
directly from the municipal government's franchise fee or from
the cable company acting under compulsion of the franchise
agreement. 800 Such a corporation constitutes not simply "a heavily regulated, privately owned utility,"801 but an actual governmental entity. 802 The contrast between governmental and private action is illustrated by a comparison of "a privately owned
and operated" utility that the law does not consider a state actor808 and a utility directed by a Board of Commissioners appointed by a City Council and subject to the local government's
ultimate control. The Supreme Court ruled that this second type
of utility was a state actor bound by the fourteenth
amendment. so•
A corporation created by the government, in which the government appointed its members and charged it with the duty of
running the public access channel and facility, 8011 is not "primondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982). The state action doctrine recognizes "the
essential dichotomy" between deprivation of "life, liberty, or property without due process of law" by the state and by "private conduct 'however discriminatory or wrongful'
against which the Fourteenth Amendment offers no shield." Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)).
299. "(V]iewed doctrinally, the state action cases are 'a conceptual disaster area.'" L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 18-1, at 1690 (2d ed. 1988) (quoting Black, The
Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: 'State Action,' Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967)).
300. See generally Johnson, Public Access and Local Government: An Uneasy Relationship, 8 COMMUNITY TELEVISION REV. 18 (1985):
Local governments often incorporate the non-profit group and appoint their
original board of directors (sometimes they continue to control appointments to
the board for all time). Many local governments are responsible for the access
corporation's budgetary oversight; it is fairly common for the local government
to allocate a portion of the franchise fee to access. In some instances, the government hires staff and is directly responsible for administering the use of the access channel.
Id. at 19.
301. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358 (finding a privately owned and operated electric utility
not a state actor).
302. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 68 (1963) (holding threats by
unpaid commission, appointed by governor and charged by law with investigating and
recommending prosecution of obscene publications, "constituted acts of the State within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment").
303. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 346 (1974).
304. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 4 (1978).
305. See, e.g., Taylor & Brand, supra note 287, at 82 ("[A)n Access Management
Corporation ... is a corporation set up by city ordinance to handle access. It is granted
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vate," but governmental. Such an entity is "bound to disseminate all views. For, being an arm of the Government, it would be
unable by reason of the First Amendment to 'abridge' some sectors of thought in favor of others. " 308
Some organizations that manage access centers are not so obviously public. For example, in Fayetteville, Arkansas, a consortium of arts, social service, and community groups formed a
nonprofit organization that negotiated a contract with the local
cable company to manage the public access channel established
in the franchise between the company and the city. 307 The first
amendment binds even such a "private" access manager, however, in the operation of the access channels and facilities. 808
The access corporation presents a different question from
whether a private party that receives government funding, such
as a school or a nursing home, constitutes a "state actor" so as to
have its personnel or medical decisions governed by the fourteenth amendment. 809 It is also distinct from the question of
whether state action exists when a private electrical utility discontinues service to a customer or when a warehouseman utilizes
a state law to resolve a "private" commercial dispute. 810
Rather, a corporation managing public access facilities and
channels must respect the first amendment rights of access users
because, even if "private," the corporation manages a public facility. Public access channels are governmentally created,
a portion of the franchise fee, and its operation and relationship with both the city and
the cable operator is established by city ordinance."); Manley & Hartzog, Who Should
Manage Access? Austin: Nonprofit managed access still going strong, 6 COMMUNITY TELEVISION REV. 14, 18 (1983) (describing the Board of Trustees of the Boston Community
Access Programming Foundation, which is responsible for managing public access, as
"appointed by the city").
306. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 150 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
307. Manley & Hartzog, supra note 305, at 18. In Austin, Texas, Austin Community
Television, originally an organization of student volunteers, operates under a contract
with the city to manage access. Id.
308. See D. BRENNER & M. PRICE, supra note 137, § 6.09 [1] at 6-88 to 6-89 n.11.
The protections in Freedman appear to be as applicable to cablecast material as
to motion picture theaters, since the danger of the chilling effect of prior submissions to a censorship board will be the same for both. It would also seem to
apply to other bodies delegated censorship power by the state or the Cable Act,
in particular those overseeing public access and commercial channels.
Id.
The Freedman standards are discussed supra at text accompanying note 256.
309. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991
(1982); see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (holding that a public defender is not a state actor in representation of clients).
310. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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originating in the municipal government's franchise agreement
and authorized by the federal Cable Act. 811 The channels and
the "services, facilities or equipment" provided for their use812
are public. When running this public facility, the access center
acts as "the repository of state power."818 Significantly, the
center has not received the power of an electronic editor, but the
power of the "traffic officer." 814 The center has been given the
power to ensure that the public forum runs smoothly.
This situation, therefore, presents more than a case of a private party leasing public land for its own use. 8111 Congress expressly intended that the "[p]ublic access channels available
under [the Cable Act] would be available to all, poor and
wealthy alike." 816 The access channel is not "leased" for the use
of the access management corporation. The corporation must
run the channel for the "public ... use," 817 and this "use" in- _
eludes the exercise of the right of free speech by the members of
a community. 818
The significance of this dedication of the access channel for
public discourse can be seen in a comparison with the cases rejecting a first amendment right for the public to communicate in
a private shopping center. 319 In holding that private shopping
center owners could bar picketing and distribution of handbills
on their private property, the Court concluded: "[T]here has
311. Cable Act § 611, 47 U.S.C. § 531.
312. See Cable Act § 61l(c), 47 U.S.C. § 531(c). This does not necessarily mean that
an access center is a "state actor" insofar as employee relations are concerned. Cf.
Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840 (finding no state action in the employment decisions of a
private school that received most of its funding from the government). Rather, the access
center is subject to constitutional requirements in its operation of the public's access
channels, facilities, and equipment.
313. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 286 (1913).
314. Cf. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) (finding that the Communications Act of 1934 did not limit the FCC's responsibilities over broadcasting to "supervision of the traffic [on the airwaves]. It puts upon the Commission the burden of determining the composition of that traffic.").
315. Cf. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (finding state
action in racial discrimination practiced by private restaurant leasing public space and
paying substantial funds for its use, because the State had "insinuated itself into a position of interdependence" with the restaurant).
316. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 36, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS. at 4673 (emphasis added).
317. Cable Act § 611(b), 47 U.S.C. § 531(b).
318. Congress stated that public access channels "provide groups and individuals . . .
with the opportunity to become sources of information in the electronic marketplace of
ideas." H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 30, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 4667.
319. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551
(1972).
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been no such dedication of [petitioner's] privately owned and
operated shopping center to public use as to entitle respondents
to exercise therein the asserted First Amendment rights. " 320
Two critical differences distinguish the shopping center owner
and the access management corporation. First, unlike the shopping center, the Cable Act legally requires dedication of public
access channels, services, facilities, and equipment to "public
use" as a public forum. Second, even if "privately operated," the
public access channels remain publicly, not privately, owned.
Thus, in some ways, a finding of first amendment rights on
the access channels appears clearer than the finding in Evans v.
Newton321 that the fourteenth amendment governs a public
park, turned over to private trustees. That park was located on
private property and granted, in trust, to the city of Macon,
Georgia, for use "as a 'park and pleasure ground' for white people only."322 As the dissent in Evans argued: "Baconsfield had
its origin not in any significant governmental action or on any
public land but rather in the personal social philosophy of Senator Bacon and on property owned by him."323 By contrast, public access channels and facilities have their origin both in the
"significant public action" of the government franchise and in
their dedication to public use created by federal law.
In a state action analysis, the significance Congress has attached to public access becomes especially relevant. A public
function is more likely to be found for activities that Congress
considers of special importance. 824 Congress has given such spe320. Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at 570; see also Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 520.
321. 382 U.S. 296 (1966). The Supreme Court in Flagg Bros. rejected an argument
that Evans "establishes that the operation of a park for recreational purposes is an exclusively public function. We doubt that [Evans] intended to establish any such broad
doctrine in the teeth of the experience of several American entrepreneurs who amassed
great fortunes by operating parks for recreational purposes." Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks,
436 U.S. 149, 159 n.8 (1978). The Flagg Court added that Evans found state action because the change of ownership did not eliminate "the actual involvement of the city in
the daily maintenance and care of the park." Id. Insofar as this analysis is limited to a
statement that not all recreational parks involve state action, it is correct. There is, however, a fundamental difference between Disneyland, which charges an admission fee and
is obviously a private park, and the park in Evans, which was found to be "municipal in
nature." The latter was "open to every white person, there being no selective element
other than race." Evans, 382 U.S. at 301 (emphasis added). The Evans Court stated that
its finding of state action was "buttressed" by the fact that the park "serves the community." Id. at 301-02. A finding that managing a public access channel is state action can
also be buttressed by the channel's openness to all and its service to the community.
322. Evans, 382 U.S. at 297. The city thus lacked one of the prime rights of property
owners, the right to permit whomever they wanted to enter upon their land.
323. Id. at 316-17 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
324. In explaining why a sale of another's property by a warehouseman was not a
public function, the Court stated: "In construing the public-function doctrine in the elec-
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cial consideration to public access, emphasizing the critical public function that public access was intended to perform: "Thus
there can be no doubt that the purposes of access regulations
serve a most significant and compelling governmental interest-promotion of the basic underlying values of the First
Amendment itself."3 H
Even though both promote first amendment values, the governmental creation of a public forum on cable television access
channels and the governmental licensing of broadcasters differ
dramatically. In CBS v. Democratic National Committee, 328 several members of the Court discussed whether broadcasters constituted state actors. Although the Court did not reach a decision on this question, 327 the discussion of those finding no state
action remains particularly relevant.
Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion found that, although
each broadcaster acted as a "public trustee," the actions of
broadcast licensees were not state action because such a conclusion would be inconsistent with the broadcaster's "traditional
journalistic role. " 328 He then concluded:
More profoundly, it would be anomalous for us to hold,
in the name of promoting the constitutional guarantees
of free expression, that the day-to-day editorial decisions
of broadcast licensees are subject to the kind of restraints
urged by respondents. To do so in the name of the First
Amendment would be a contradiction. Journalistic discretion would in many ways be lost to the rigid limitations that the First Amendment imposes on government.
Application of such standards to broadcast licensees
would be antithetical to the very ideal, of vigorous, challenging debate on issues of public interest. 329
tion context, the Court has given special consideration to the fact that Congress, in 42
U.S.C. § 1971(a)(l), has made special provision to protect equal access to the ballot. No
such congressional pronouncement speaks to the ordinary commercial transaction
presented here." Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 158 n.7 (citations omitted).
325. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 34, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CooE CONG. &
AoMIN. NEWS at 4671.
326. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
327. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Stewart found no state action.
412 U.S. at 114-21. Justice Douglas found no state action, but stated that such decision
was not necessary to the case. See id. at 148-51. Justices White, Blackmun, and Powell
refrained from deciding the first amendment issue. Id. at 148 (Blackmun, J., concurring);
see id. at 146-47 (White, J., concurring). Finally, Justices Brennan and Marshall found
state action. Id. at 172 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
328. Id. at 116-17.
329. Id. at 120-21 (emphasis added).
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The very nature of the access channels dictates the opposite
conclusion for those who manage the channels. There is no
"journalistic discretion" involved in running a public access system; each individual access programmer exercises "journalistic
discretion." Congress itself recognized that "the very ideal of
vigorous, challenging debate" requires that the public access to
cable television be free from any gatekeeper. Quoting Judge
Learned Hand, the House Report explained how public access
furthered first amendment interests:
The interest in diverse sources of information is ["]akin
to, if indeed it is not the same as, the interest protected
by the First Amendment; it presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude
of tongues, than any kind of authoritative selection. To
many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked
upon it our all.["] 330
The state action doctrine thus restricts the power of an entity
that runs an access channel and managing access facilities. Such
an entity, supervising channels and facilities that are dedicated
by the government for public expression, is subject to the strictures of the first amendment.
Public access has the potential for providing an electronic
voice for a multitude of tongues. Neither the government, the
cable operator, nor the access manager should be permitted to
exercise "authoritative selection" over what those voices say.
CONCLUSION

The promise of cable television lies in its ability to bring an
unprecedented variety of programming into the American home.
The technology that carries this diversity also offers the means
for giving subscribers and parents the power over what programming enters their home. Individual homes can be protected
without silencing the speaker.
The first amendment requires that any plan for censoring
speech to protect those who want to keep it out of their homes
must reflect the specific technology involved. 331 The legislative
330. H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 100, at 31, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CooE CONG. &
NEWS at 4668 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 1943) (emphasis added), a{f'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)).
331. See supra text accompanying notes 40-96.
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plan for regulating pornography on cable television, embodied in
the Cable Act, fulfills this constitutional requirement. The statute protects the right not to see-to avoid "offensive" programming-by requiring that the cable operator provide each subscriber with the means to block out channels presenting such
programming. 332 This protection does not interfere with the
rights of programmers and willing viewers. If not obscene, and
therefore protected by the first amendment, the program may be
presented over a cable system, free from governmental control. 888 If the public access channel carries such a program, it
may be shown free from governmental, cable operator, and access center control. 33' The only power to censor resides with the
individual programmer and the individual subscriber.
The issue of pornography will always be a difficult one, involving essentially irreconcilable viewpoints. The new technology of
cable television presents the possibility of accommodating these
interests, with respect for the valid concerns of all sides.

332. See supra text accompanying notes 156-74 & 191-96.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 97-188 & 197-241.
334. See supra text accompanying notes 242-330.

